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ABSTRACT 
 
Conflict in a country is socially expensive and many are trying to understand 
what factors stimulate it in an effort to figure out ways to lessen its incidence. In this 
work three essays are presented on factors that drive conflict. The factors examined are: 
1) the interrelationship between climate and conflict, 2) the causality between 
commodity prices and conflict, 3) the ways cereal demand affects and is affected by 
terrorism. 
In the first essay, we use a global dataset to econometrically explore whether the 
probability of conflict is affected by climate. We find that precipitation variation does 
have a statistically significant effect. That is, the less precipitation this year relative to 
the last, the more likely the country is to suffer from civil conflict. Methodologically the 
best predictions are obtained from a semiparametric estimation technique. 
In the second essay, we econometrically investigate the dynamic relationship 
between commodity prices and the onset of conflict in Sudan. Applying Structure Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) and Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM), we find 
that wheat price is a cause of conflict events in Sudan. However, we find no feedback 
from conflict to commodity prices. 
In the third essay, we examine the extent that demand for three main cereals in 
Sudan (sorghum, millet, and wheat) is altered by the incidence of terrorism plus the 
effect of terrorism events on cereal demand. This is done by using an Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) and a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) approach. The results 
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show terrorist attacks do cause changes in commodity demand for wheat. The DAG 
analysis also tentatively suggests that wheat demand is both marginally affected by and 
directly affecting the incidence of terrorism (conflict) in Sudan. Subsequently, we 
generate forecasts for the three commodities shares with the AIDS and DAG models, 
incorporating the effects of terrorist attacks. Examining those results independently and 
jointly, we find that a composite forecast of the two generates better forecasts. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The growing incidence of conflict and the search for ways to avoid it are one of 
the society’s most challenging issues. Conflict destroys physical capital like 
infrastructure, disrupts human capital (e.g., via education achievements and health 
status), displaces people, and leads to health and poverty crises among other influences 
(Justino 2011). Note, however, that under certain circumstances, conflict can have 
positive effects. As Ruttan (2006) claims that conflict stimulated research and 
development (R&D), along with military and defense spending have played a primary 
and significant role in technology development. Nevertheless, in general, the more 
intense conflicts are, the more serious are the consequences they pose. For example, the 
typical cost of a civil war is estimated to be at least 50 billion dollars (Collier 2004). 
In response to this substantial cost, many in the scientific community have 
explored what factors drive conflict as a way to give information to those trying to 
mitigate or prevent violent conflict as well as to promote or build peace. Diverse causes 
of conflict have been proposed, involving ones falling into social, economic and even 
climatological categories (Blattman and Miguel 2010). Specifically, some have been 
identified economic conditions (e.g., rate of economic growth), operation of state 
institutions, existence of ethnic nationalism, and level of secondary school attainment as 
drivers. For example, Collier (2004) states that the most vital drivers of conflict are 
economic elements. Furthermore, Collier (2004) points out that it is fairly easy for the 
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poorest countries to be caught in the “conflict trap”, a vicious cycle of economic decline 
and war. Therefore, they argue that international efforts are needed to assist those 
impoverished countries in avoiding the “conflict trap”. 
In addition, there exists a well-known argument that natural resources 
endowments and their governance are drivers. Classic economic theory suggests that 
sufficient natural resources can accelerate economic growth as “physical and human 
capital”. Nevertheless, our world has witnessed many conflict events mainly happening 
in African countries, which are endowed with ample natural resources such as diamonds 
and oil with perhaps governance as the cause. Moreover, an increasing number of studies 
have found robust evidence supporting that nations with abundant resources tend to 
perform badly in growth (Sachs and Warner 2001). In other words, it is the “natural 
resource curse”.  
Climate change has also been mentioned as a potential contributing factor. 
Nevertheless, due to the inherent complexity of conflict, assertions on the importance of 
the potential causes mentioned above remain controversial and under investigation. 
Many issues regarding the interrelationship among climate, conflict and 
economics remain unsolved. The broad objective of this dissertation is to 
econometrically investigate the extent to which climate and selected economic forces 
contribute to conflict or are influenced by conflict. Specifically, the following topics will 
be addressed. 
 The climate-conflict nexus. I will empirically explore the association between 
climate and the global incidence of conflict cases. 
 3 
 
 The extent in a case country setting to which conflict is influenced by or 
influences commodity prices and consumption. In particular, I will explore 
this utilizing data from the undivided Sudan, a country in Africa that has been 
going through conflict for a majority of its history. Specifically, two aspects 
will be examined. 
o The relationship between food prices and conflict outbreak. This will 
be achieved by studying the dynamic relationship of commodity 
prices and conflict onset. 
o The way commodity demand is influenced by or influences conflict in 
the form of terrorism. 
The work done in this dissertation will be reported through three essays. Chapter 
II presents the results of efforts on climate and conflict globally. Chapter III reports on 
the analysis regarding prices and conflict in Sudan. Chapter IV reports on the analysis of 
relationships between demand and terrorism in Sudan. 
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CHAPTER II 
CLIMATE AS A CAUSE OF CONFLICT: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

 
Introduction 
Both climate change and conflict pose threats to the economy, human welfare, 
and security. A number of authors have argued that climate is one of the drivers of 
conflict but there have been counterarguments (e.g., Hsiang et al. 2013; Benjaminsen et 
al. 2012). Here we investigate the strength of that association using a global dataset. In 
particular, we econometrically examine if climate directly or indirectly influences the 
probability of conflict and estimate the effects of projected climate change on conflict 
incidence. 
Numerous countries have suffered or are suffering from conflict in recent history, 
with devastating and long-lasting effects. Specifically, conflict has eroded physical 
assets like infrastructure and homes, reduced services from natural assets via destruction 
or confiscation for military purposes, worsened economic conditions through job losses 
and high inflation, weakened the labor force via injuries or deaths, and worsened social 
assets by forced migration or psychological damages (Verner 2010). The literature 
advances a set of diverse factors that can provoke conflict including social, political, 
natural resource, economic, foreign aid and climatic ones, but there still remains debate 
                                                 

 Reprinted with permission from “Climate as a Cause of Conflict: an Econometric Analysis” by Chen, J., 
B.A. McCarl, E.C. Price, X. Wu, and D.A. Bessler, Presented at Southern Agricultural Economics 
Association Annual Meeting, Texas, 2016. Copyright [2016] by SAEA. 
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about the linkages and the strength of association among these items (Blattman and 
Miguel 2010).
1
 
The past few decades have witnessed unprecedented climate change with an 
accelerating rising global average temperature, and observed regional changes in 
precipitation, extreme event frequency, and increasing sea level among other diverse 
effects (IPCC 2013, 2014). A continuing degree of future climate change has been 
projected by many scientific groups. Substantial evidence indicates such climate change 
influences environmental and social systems (e.g., IPCC 2007 a, b, and c, 2012, 2013, 
2014; Carnesale and Chameides 2011; USCCSP 2008). In particular, a series of IPCC 
reports (2007 a, b, and c, 2012, 2013, 2014) document observed climate change 
consequences, including melting ice and snow, altered crop and livestock yields, 
declining populations of certain plants and animals, increased damages from pests, and 
exacerbated extreme event effects. 
In recent years, there has been substantial speculation that climate conditions 
contribute to conflict (e.g., Burke et al. 2009; Hsiang et al. 2013). While it is unlikely 
that climate is the unique or dominant cause of conflict, it may act as an accelerant. For 
instance, climate change may give rise to resource scarcities like reduced availability of 
water and food, which could spur riots, and protests and in turn violent conflict. That’s 
why climate change is termed “a threat multiplier” by military planners (CNA 2007). In 
fact, given that climate conditions can cause for example food shortages, pest and 
                                                 
1
 Blattman and Miguel (2010) state that the finding that economic conditions are correlated with conflicts 
is the most significant empirical conclusion in the current literature. 
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disease expansion, and water scarcity, it is not surprising that climate could trigger 
conflict. Recently, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) examines 
evidence of the interconnection and calls for more research (IPCC 2014). We therefore 
examine the climate – conflict nexus as it arises in the global data hopefully improving 
the understanding of the interactions and shedding light on policy design and 
implementation. Our parametric and semiparametric analyses provide robust evidence 
suggesting that the probability of civil conflict outbreak could increase due to a decline 
in precipitation compared to last year. 
Literature Review 
IPCC (2014) devotes a chapter to “human security” and includes a section on 
“conflict”. The Secretary General of the United Nations (Ki-Moon 2007) states that the 
conflict occurring in Darfur was being caused by “an ecological crisis, arising at least in 
part from climate change”. Also the “Arab Spring” – wave of protests, uprisings and 
armed conflict that spread across the Arab world – has been argued to have underlying 
climatic causes (Werrell and Femia 2013). Admittedly, it is also widely acknowledged 
that brutal governments or wide gaps in income and many other non-climatic factors 
may induce conflict (CenSEI 2012). 
Over the past decade, a rapidly growing body of literature has explored the 
connection between climate and conflict. Here, we generally discuss several of the 
commonly asserted causal chains. We also note that Dell et al. (2014) provides a 
thorough and exhaustive summary of the current climate-conflict related literature. 
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Many studies have focused on linkages between precipitation, temperature, and 
conflict. Burke et al. (2009) conclude that there is a robust linkage between temperature 
and civil war in Africa with warmer years sparking wars. Gartzke (2012) examines 
relationships between global average temperatures and interstate conflict, but finds that 
climate is not necessarily a causal influence. However others suggest that the reason for 
such results is ignoring non-stationarity of the dataset (Devitt and Tol 2012).  
Miguel et al. (2004) investigate the interrelationship between civil war and 
rainfall variability in Africa (Theisen et al. 2013). They find that a decline in rainfall can 
fuel conflict. Hendrix and Glaser (2007) arrive at a similar conclusion in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, Ciccone (2011) argues that a misspecification of rainfall could account 
for such a conclusion and that inclusion of rainfall level might be more appropriate. 
Miguel and Satyanath (2011) illustrate that rainfall variations are treated as instruments 
in their paper and that Ciccone’s (2011) arguments lack theoretical support. Hendrix and 
Salehyan (2012) conclude that African extreme rainfall deviations – drought and heavy 
rainfall – are associated with greater likelihood of conflict. Maystadt and Ecker (2014) 
find that longer and more severe droughts contribute to conflict outbreak in Somalia. 
Hsiang et al. (2013) detects a significant correlation between climate and human conflict 
based on a meta-analysis of 60 previous studies. 
Nel and Righarts (2008) suggest that natural disasters can significantly spur 
violent conflict particularly in low- and middle- income nations. In contrast, Slettebak 
(2012) asserts that climatic natural disasters lessen the outbreak of civil war by 
suppressing aggression. Besley and Persson (2011) find that natural disasters enhance 
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the chance of civil war. Bergholt and Lujala (2012) obtain the opposite conclusion: 
finding climatic disasters do not affect conflict. Theisen et al. (2013) argue that the 
different results likely stem from an endogeneity problem. A number of other studies do 
not find any significant relationship (e.g., Buhaug 2010; Benjaminsen et al. 2012). 
Raleigh and Urdal (2007) state that a higher level of water scarcity increases the 
risk of conflict. Lecoutere et al. (2010) reaches a similar conclusion as do Tir and 
Stinnett (2012). Dinar et al. (2007) offer a different viewpoint, indicating that nations 
usually prefer to cooperate with each other instead of fighting when facing water scarcity 
issues. 
To date, it appears that research with a longer time horizon shows climate affects 
conflict as opposed to studies with a shorter time period. Additionally, climate probably 
indirectly affects conflict through multiple channels such as institutional effectiveness, 
human migration, crop failures and water shortage (Scheffran et al. 2012). Generally the 
literature aforementioned does not collectively permit drawing systematic conclusions 
about the climate-conflict relationship. IPCC (2014) has suggested that more extensive 
analysis is needed regarding the interconnection across different environmental 
conditions and conflict events over an extended time period. We therefore examine the 
climate-conflict nexus as it arises in global data in order to improve understanding of the 
interactions, and to support policy design and implementation to mitigate conflict and 
build the conditions for peace. 
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Objectives and Procedures 
This study seeks to examine the linkage between climate and conflict using 
global data. This will be done by econometrically estimating a model that predicts the 
probabilities of conflict incidence and how they are affected by climate variations. The 
dataset unifies measures of historical annual climate, conflict incidence and country 
related characteristics. The final dataset ranges from 1950 to 2006, covering conflict 
events in 165 countries. The dataset is discussed in the following subsections. 
Climate Data 
Historical country-year level climate data were drawn from Dell et al. (2012)
2
 
who sourced data from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900–2006 
Gridded Monthly Time Series (0.5 × 0.5), Version 1.01 (Matsuura and Willmott 2007). 
Additionally, Dell et al. (2012) computed country-year level averages using a 
population-weighting scheme. Dell et al. (2012) provide a detailed description of the 
climate data and their processing. 
Following Miguel et al. (2004), we also include data on “weather variations” 
from prior years.
3
 In particular we construct a “temperature variation” variable as the 
                                                 
2
 Other global databases could have been used, such as the Global Precipitation Climatology Project 
(GPCP) database, the National Centers for Environment Prediction (NCEP) database and the U.N. Food 
and Agricultural Organization Climatic (FAOCLIM) database. The major reason we used Dell et al. 
(2012) is the region to country wide weighting scheme. Despite the different mechanisms and standards 
among the three aforementioned global databases, they are highly correlated, which would probably 
produce similar results (Miguel et al. 2004). 
3
 NASA indicates that the measure of time determines the difference between weather and climate: 
“Weather is what conditions of the atmosphere are over a short period of time, and climate is how the 
atmosphere ‘behaves’ over relatively long periods of time.” Therefore, we hereafter use the “weather” 
instead of “climate” as Dell et al. (2012) do, given that we study the annual levels of temperature and 
precipitation in this paper. 
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proportional change from the previous year, (𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1)/𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1, and denote it as ∆𝑇𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑇𝑖,𝑡  is the temperature observation for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Likewise, we compute a 
precipitation variation variable as ∆𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1)/𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1, where 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  is the 
precipitation observation for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 
Conflict Data 
Data on conflict incidence are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset, which defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which 
at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2012)).
4
 Taking into account the 
complexity of conflict, we narrow our research scope down to civil war. Specifically, we 
mainly focus on conflict incidence, which is coded as 1 for all country-year observations 
with at least one conflict and 0 otherwise. 
Other Country Characteristics Data 
It is well acknowledged that there exist many determinants of conflict. However, 
it is almost impossible to account for and precisely measure all of them. Consequently, 
                                                 
4
 Compared with the widely used Correlates of War (COW) database, UCDP/PRIO dataset has more 
transparent structure and relatively lower threshold of conflict definition in terms of battle deaths (25 
yearly battle-related deaths), thus incorporating more relatively small conflict events where these low 
intensity conflict events probably play a significant role in small countries (Bergholt and Lujala 2012; 
Miguel et al. 2004). Admittedly, the main disadvantage associated with the UCDP/PRIO dataset is the lack 
of accurate conflict information, such as the exact date and numbers of conflict deaths, setting limits on 
their use in empirical research (Miguel et al. 2004). Nonetheless, as we mentioned before, UCDP/PRIO 
dataset is still preferred given that it encompasses lower level conflict events than its peers do (Nel and 
Righarts 2008). Taking into account that conflict is fairly complicated and somewhat difficult to precisely 
define empirically, we decide to narrow our research scope down to civil war. Correspondingly, in the 
UCDP/PRIO database, civil war includes two categories: internal armed conflict, and internationalized 
internal armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2012). 
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many kinds of forcing variables have been argued for inclusion along with alternative 
measurement methods. The control variables included in this study have been identified 
as significant components in fueling conflict by a majority of previous literature and are 
discussed below. 
First, we include population size allowing that larger populations could impose a 
burden on local development and cause more potential conflict (Cervellati et al. 2011; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003). Goldstone (1991) and Salehyan and Hendrix (2014) argue that, 
societies, especially agrarian societies, with faster population growth rates are more 
likely to exhibit conflict than those with slower rates. 
Second, we include economic development in the form of GDP per capita in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) following Nel and Righarts (2008) and Hegre 
and Sambanis (2006). This allows for the possibility that lower economic levels may 
stimulate higher probabilities of conflict outbreak as argued by Hegre and Sambani 
(2006) and Salehyan and Hendrix (2014). Also per capita income reflects financial, 
military and police strength plus may reflect the ease of recruiting young men to become 
rebels (Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
Third, an indicator of political regime type is incorporated. That indicator ranges 
from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) and accounts for the 
possibility that political status might affect conflict likelihood (Cervellati et al. 2011). 
These data are obtained from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers 2012). 
Following Hegre (2001), a squared term is also added to allow for a curvilinear effect. 
That is, we permit countries with the least (-10) and most (10) democratic regime types 
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to be less likely to experience conflict. Both population and GDP per capita data are 
obtained from the Penn World Table version 7.1 (Heston et al. 2012) and log-
transformed to reduce skewness (i.e., to generate less bias at the extremes). In addition, 
all of the control variables are lagged one year, in order to take into account the 
probability of reversed causality and time lags (Theisen 2008).  
To consider other country characteristics, such as ethnic polarization and 
geographical characteristics, we include country fixed effects that are designed to 
exclude these time invariant influences. Other country level control variables, like 
income inequality or unemployment rate, are not incorporated due to missing or dubious 
values among the available datasets (Miguel et al. 2004). In addition, we investigate 
models with and without time trend in accordance with the arguments in Nelson and 
Kang (1984). 
Methodology 
The analysis will be conducted in a rolling window scheme, which allows for a 
system that is evolving over time (Swanson 1998). That is, the length of the time period 
for the estimations is fixed but is treated in a way that permits out-of-sample reliability 
testing. Given that our whole dataset spans 57 years, the last ten years (1997 – 2006) are 
used for out-of-sample model validation. Particularly, we keep a fixed length of 47 years 
as the estimation window and then generate one-step-ahead forecasts (i.e., do a 
prediction for the 48th year). Initially we use the subsample 1950 - 1996 to predict 
conflict incidence in 1997, and then estimate using the subsample 1951 - 1997 to predict 
conflict incidence in 1998. We continue this procedure 10 times and at each time the 
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fixed estimation window is rolled ahead one year. In turn, we evaluate predictive 
capability of the estimated models with two criteria, by comparing the 10-year out-of-
sample probability forecasts with the true values. Finally, the best model is selected 
through a model-validation process. 
Below we describe the construction and specification of models used in our 
analysis. 
Parametric Models 
Given that our data are collected over multiple time periods for individual 
countries, panel models are employed to take into account unobserved country level 
heterogeneity. This helps avoid biased estimations. Another obvious benefit is that panel 
datasets possess more data points, thus they increase degrees of freedom, flexibility and 
reduce the possibility of collinearity among covariates (see, e.g., Hsiao (2003)). 
The general reduced-form panel model can be characterized by the following 
function (Dell et al. 2014): 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝜷𝒇(𝑪𝒊,𝒕, 𝑪𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) +  𝜸𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜃𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑡        (2.1) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 index country and year. 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
∗  is the outcome of interest – the conflict 
probability. 𝑪𝒊,𝒕 represents historical weather variables and a vector of general functional 
form 𝒇(∙) is included to permit flexible implications of climatic variables. 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 is a 
vector of control variables (covariates), containing GDP per capital, political regime 
types and population. 𝛼𝑖 captures the country-specific and time-invariant characteristics, 
commonly known as “fixed effects”. 𝜃𝑡 is a time trend, which enables us to identify the 
relationships from idiosyncratic disturbances by neutralizing possible common trends 
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(Dell et al. 2014). 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term with 𝐸(𝜖𝑖𝑡) = 0, and those 
disturbances can be correlated across time horizon for each country. 𝜷 is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated that give weather effects on conflict; 𝜸 is also a vector of 
parameters that measures the impacts of the other country-related characteristics on 
conflict. 
Before proceeding, several caveats are worth mentioning. First of all, many 
studies (e.g., Miguel et al. 2004) utilize climatic variables as instruments to study other 
non-climatic phenomenon, at the cost of imposing exclusion restrictions to obtain causal 
inference. Weather instruments, however, may not be strong enough when dealing with 
the worldwide dataset. Hence the results of subsamples are usually weather dependent 
(Burke 2012). The reduced-form panel method utilized in this study can achieve more 
robust results, due to relatively fewer assumptions of identification as argued in Dell et 
al. (2014). Secondly, we incorporate fixed effects to account for unobserved country 
level determinants that may influence the likelihood of conflict. Additionally, as Burke 
(2012) points out, the standard errors need to be robust during estimation to account for 
heteroscedasticity, and estimation should be performed by clustering across countries to 
avoid potential serial correlation. 
Since the dependent variable yi,t is binary, we use a panel logit approach to 
estimate the probability of conflict (Greene 2003; Hsiao 2003; Burke and Leiga 2010). 
The model takes the form 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑪𝒊,𝒕, 𝑪𝒊,𝒕−𝟏, 𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏, 𝛼𝑖, 𝜃𝑡) = 𝐺(𝜷𝒇(𝑪𝒊,𝒕, 𝑪𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) +  𝜸𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜃𝑡)    (2.2) 
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where 𝐺(∙) is the logistic distribution. For estimation, a conditional maximum likelihood 
method is employed.
5
 We choose the logit models instead of the probit, since it has been 
argued that probit models are not suitable under fixed effects treatments (Burke and 
Leiga 2010; Greene 2003). 
Semiparametric Models 
It is well acknowledged that due to the strict assumptions about functional forms, 
parametric panel models can be misspecified and give rise to inconsistent estimators as a 
result. To circumvent this problem, we also consider semiparametric single index 
models. They generally serve as a compromise between confining parametric models 
and flexible but difficult to estimate fully nonparametric models (Hristache et al. 2001). 
Additionally, such models are readily interpretable and maintain much of the flexibility 
of nonparametric models (Härdle et al. 2004). For details about the single index models, 
please refer to Ichimura (1993) and Li and Racine (2007). 
Following Li and Racine (2007), the single index model is expressed as 
𝑌 = 𝑔(𝑿′𝜷𝟎) + 𝑢            (2.3) 
where the dependent variable 𝑌 is the civil conflict measurement, the vector of 
independent variables 𝑿 (𝑞 × 1) represents the set of weather and country characteristic 
variables, 𝜷𝟎 (𝑞 × 1) stands for a vector of parameters to be estimated, and 𝑢 is the 
disturbance term with 𝐸(𝑢|𝑿)  = 0. Aside from weather measures, the explanatory 
variable 𝑿 includes economic factors, population and democracy degree. 𝑿′𝜷𝟎 is termed 
                                                 
5
 Unconditional maximum likelihood (UML) yields biased estimated coefficients for logit models (Hsiao 
2003). 
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as a “single index” because it is a scalar. Only the linear index (𝑿′𝜷𝟎) is specified 
whereas the functional form 𝑔(∙) remains unknown. To some extent, a single index 
model can be treated as a generalized logit model, since it keeps the linear index 
unchanged and relaxes the requirement of function 𝑔(∙) to be arbitrarily smooth (Härdle 
et al. 2004). 
Many estimation approaches have been proposed for this model. The two most 
widely used methods are those introduced by Ichimura (1993) and Klein and Spady 
(1993). The former is appropriate for continuous outcomes while the latter is best suited 
for binary values (Racine 2009). Given the context of binary variable (conflict 
incidence), we use the kernel-based estimator by Klein and Spady, with bandwidth is 
determined by the method of cross-validation. 
Model Selection Criteria 
We utilize two commonly-used criteria to assess the predictive performance of 
models aforementioned. 
The first measure is the Brier score, a quadratic scoring rule with a rich history of 
applications (Brier 1950; Bessler and Ruffley 2004). The Brier score evaluates the 
prediction ability of models with binary or continuous dependent variables and offers an 
overall picture of their performance. The lower the Brier score, the better the predictive 
performance. Yates (1988) further provides a covariance decomposition of the Brier 
score for more thorough and extensive analyses, which allows accounting for both 
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calibration and resolution by different components.
6
 In particular, one term called 
“calibration-in-the-large” (or Bias) captures the models’ general miscalibration over all 
the probability forecasts. On the other hand, the covariance of predictions and actual 
outcomes index represents models’ resolution or sorting ability. That is, it reflects the 
ability of a model to distinguish occasions in which event does occur from those where it 
does not, which is regarded as the heart or core of forecasting strength (Yates 1982). 
Here higher covariance means better responsiveness of the predictions to the available 
information. More discussion about each component of Brier score will be presented 
below, together with the model comparison. 
Another way to visualize and evaluate models’ performance involves use of the 
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (Fawcett 2004). The ROC curve 
characterizes the true positive rate (“sensitivity”) versus the false positive rate (1- 
“specificity”) for all possible cutoffs (Fawcett 2004). On the grounds that ROC curves 
capture models’ discrimination performance in a two-dimensional way, it is probably 
easier to compare different models just based on one dimension – a scalar. Generally, 
this dimension reduction can be achieved by evaluating the area under the ROC curve, 
abbreviated AUC (Fawcett 2006). An area of 0.5 means a useless model, which is 
equivalent to random guessing, such as flipping a coin (tail or head); an area of 1 
indicates a perfect model, which can unerringly tell when conflict events do and do not 
                                                 
6
 Calibration refers to a model’s ability to issue a probability that is consistent with its relative frequency, 
ex post; Resolution refers to a model’s ability to partition uncertain outcomes into subgroups that vary 
from its relative frequency in the long-run (Bessler and Ruffley 2004).    
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occur. That is, the higher the AUC, the better the discrimination ability of the model. 
Generally an AUC above 0.8 is considered to be “good” (El Khouli et al. 2009). 
Empirical Results 
As Friedman (1953) asserts, “The ultimate goal of a positive science is the 
development of a ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’ that yields valid and meaningful (i.e., not 
truistic) predictions about phenomena not yet observed.” Accordingly, in this study, we 
focus on out-of-sample predictive ability to choose the best model. 
As aforementioned, a rolling window approach with a fixed time length is 
implemented to generate dynamic one-step-ahead forecasts of conflict incidence for 
1997 – 2006. Additionally, given controversy regarding the inclusion of time trend we 
consider models with and without the trend variable. We will also look at models with 
and without adjustments for stationarity. The results in four models are listed as below. 
Model 1: Original Series + Quadratic Time Trend 
Model 2: Original Series + No Time Trend 
Model 3: Stationary Series + Quadratic Time Trend 
Model 4: Stationary Series + No Time Trend 
In our dataset, GDP is the only nonstationary series (I (1)), thus we take the first 
difference to render it stationary. 
Model Evaluation 
In what follows, we will assess models’ predictive performance through several 
widely used criteria. 
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Brier Score and its Yates’ Covariance Decompositions 
The Brier scores for one-step-ahead forecasts are presented in Table 1. 
Components from the Yates’ covariance decompositions are displayed below them.7 
 
Table 1. Brier Scores and Their Yates' Decompositions 
 
Panel Logit Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Brier Score 0.1456 0.1385 0.1452 0.1386 
Bias
2
 0.0138 0.0072 0.0140 0.0081 
Scatter 0.0013 0.0017 0.0011 0.0016 
MinVar 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Dvar 0.1298 0.1298 0.1298 0.1298 
2Cov -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0010 
 
Single Index Model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Brier Score 0.1170 0.1131 0.0948 0.0863 
Bias
2
 0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Scatter 0.0213 0.0214 0.0383 0.0338 
MinVar 0.0026 0.0034 0.0150 0.0172 
Dvar 0.1299 0.1299 0.1298 0.1298 
2Cov 0.0369 0.0421 0.0884 0.0946 
Notes: Yates' decompositions of Brier Score is given by the numbers below "Brier score" 
in each column. Brier Score=DVAR+MinVar+Scatter+ Bias
2
-2Cov. 
 
On the basis of Brier score, the semiparametric models exhibit better predictive 
power than the corresponding parametric models. Generally, within either parametric or 
semiparametric models, models without time trend perform better than models with time 
                                                 
7
 Note that in the case of a binary dependent variable, the Mean Squared Error (MSE) is equivalent to the 
Brier score. That is, the increase in the Brier scores reflects deterioration in models’ forecasting ability. 
 20 
 
trend (Model 1 vs Model 2; Model 3 vs Model 4). Models with stationary series do a 
better job than models with original series (Model 1 vs Model 3; Model 2 vs Model 4). 
The only exception is that Model 2 and Model 4 for parametric models perform about 
the same. Additionally, one natural question that arises is: in what way do the 
semiparametric models outperform the parametric ones? This can be answered by 
examining the results from the Yates’ decomposition. 
Generally the semiparametric models show a lower “Bias2”8 (0.000 – 0.004), 
they therefore do a better job of matching the mean forecasts to the relative frequency of 
conflict. The semiparametric models are more sensitive to the information related to the 
outcomes in the future as measured by the covariance between forecasts and the outcome 
index (labeled as “2Cov”). Moreover, the positive sign of that term indicates the 
responsiveness is in the right direction.
9
 Nevertheless, the semiparametric models do not 
always outperform the parametric models. For instance, they have larger scatter values 
(labeled as “Scatter”), which quantify the overall noise in the forecasts. Similarly, 
semiparametric models portray a larger minimum forecast variance (labeled as 
“MinVar”), which reflects the minimum amount of forecast variability that must be 
tolerated (Yates 1988).  
                                                 
8
 “Dvar” is the variance of the outcome index and will not be discussed here, since it is out of the models’ 
control (Bessler and Ruffey 2004); “MinVar” is the minimum forecast variance; “Scatter” could be 
regarded as the excess variability of the forecast (Casillas-Olvera and Bessler 2006); “Bias2” is the 
squared term of “Bias”, where “Bias” is the “calibration-in-the-large”; “Cov” is the covariance between 
forecast and actual outcomes. 
9
 In some cases with negative covariance term (e.g., parametric Model 1 and 3), zero covariance might be 
chosen instead to minimize the Brier score (Casillas-Olvera and Bessler 2006). 
 21 
 
To summarize, compared to the semiparametric models, parametric models are 
superior with respect to the characteristics of “Scatter” and “MinVar”, whereas they are 
inferior with regarding to the metrics of “Bias2” and “2Cov”. Intuitively, covariance 
reflects the responsiveness of the model to the information pertinent to the conflict 
incidence, while the scatter indicates the responsiveness of the model to the information 
not pertinent to the conflict incidence (Casillas-Olvera and Bessler 2006). In this way, 
we propose that parametric models are better at filtering irrelevant information or 
excluding noise. However, they screen out some vital information as well, which may 
play a key role in predicting the probability of conflict incidence. On the other hand, 
semiparametric models perform comparatively better in capturing useful information. 
Nevertheless, it is highly likely that they achieve higher covariance values at the cost of 
incorporating irrelevant knowledge. To some extent, our results appear to be consistent 
with the results cited in Yates (1982)
10
 and Bessler and Ruffley (2004), where an 
increase in scatter and covariance occurred together. A caveat has to be made here. The 
component called variance of the outcome index (labeled as “Dvar”) has not been 
discussed in preceding sections. The major reason is that it is entirely out of the models’ 
control, representing the base rate in which conflict does take place (Bessler and Ruffley 
2004). All in all, based on the Brier score and its covariance decomposition, the 
semiparametric model with stationary series and without time trend (i.e., Model 4) 
outperforms the other alternative models considered. 
                                                 
10
 Yates (1982) finds that the subject with the best Brier score has both higher scatter and covariance, 
compared to the subject with the medium Brier score. 
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Beyond the numeric analyses above, we also present covariance graphs on the 
model performance (Figure 1). They reflect the resolution ability among models, 
distinguishing conflicts that take place from those that do not take place. On the x-axis, 0 
means conflicts that happen while 1 implies conflicts that do not happen. Accordingly, 
y-axis represents the probability forecasts for the two kinds of outcomes (i.e., 0 and 1). 
Therefore, we seek to obtain the desired model that generates low probabilities (at or 
near 0) for the outcome with 0, and high probabilities (at or near 1) for the outcome with 
1 (Casillas-Olvera and Bessler 2006). In other words, models with perfect resolution (or 
sorting) ability correspond with the 45° line (i.e., the solid line in each sub-graph in 
Figure 1). The dashed-line is the covariance graph for each model by regressing the 
probability forecasts on the dummy outcome index. 
Comparison of graphs in panel (A) and (B) indicates the superiority of 
semiparametric models relative to parametric models in sorting. Parametric models 
assign low forecast probabilities to both outcome index 0 and 1, so the dashed lines in 
panel (A) are much flatter than those of semiparametric models in panel (B). Admittedly, 
semiparametric models’ covariance graphs show a larger dispersion in their forecasts for 
outcome index 0 and 1 than parametric ones. Still, their larger slopes (0.142 – 0.364) 
compared to the parametric ones’ (-0.002 – 0.004) strongly indicate their better goodness 
of sorting conflict incidence cases, under the context of conflict. Particularly, the 
semiparametric model 4, again, dominates, owning to its largest slope (0.364) among all 
the models investigated here. 
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(A) Panel Logit Model 
 
(B) Single Index Model 
Figure 1. Covariance Graph for Probability Forecasts on Conflict Incidence 
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Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve 
ROC curves for all models studied are displayed in Figure 2. The diagonal 
straight line y=x stands for models containing no useful information, while the point (0, 
1) symbolizes the perfect classification. In other words, the better models lie in the upper 
triangular region and are further away from the diagonal. 
As we mentioned earlier, we will use the area under the ROC curve (AUC), a 
single scalar, to compare model classification abilities. It can be seen that all parametric 
models have the AUC of 0.5353 – 0.5700, while all semiparametric models have the 
AUC of 0.7412 – 0.8878. Moreover, all of these values are statistically significant 
greater than 0.5 using the Wilcoxon nonparametric tests. That is, all models do better in 
prediction, compared to random guessing.  Interestingly, the results agree with those 
suggested by the Brier score: namely models without time trend outperform models with 
time trend; semiparametric models outperform parametric ones. Consequently, 
depending on the values of AUC, the semiparametric model with stationary series and 
without time trend (Model 4) is the best candidate model (AUC = 0.8878). 
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(A) Panel Logit Model 
 
(B) Single Index Model 
Figure 2. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve 
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.5353
(1)
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.5597
(2)
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.5330
(3)
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.5700
(4)
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.7412
(1)
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.7676
(2)
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.8672
(3)
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.8878
(4)
 26 
 
Weather Effects Results 
Now we use the best performing single index model (stationary series, without 
time trend – Model 4) to analyze the climate conflict nexus with the whole dataset. 
To quantify the effects of the weather variation on conflict incidence, we 
compute the Average Marginal Effects (AME). These measure the change in probability 
of conflict outbreak when an independent variable (i.e., weather variation) increases by 
one unit while keeping all the other independent variables unchanged. To make the 
results comparable across different studies, the effects are standardized by transforming 
the original AME to a relative change in the dependent variable – conflict incidence 
(Hsiang et al. 2013). Given that only the coefficient of precipitation variation (not 
temperature variation) is statistically significant during the estimation, we focus on the 
standardized AME of precipitation variation in this discussion 
The panel logit model suggests that a 1% increase in the difference in 
precipitation from this year to last lowers the probability of civil conflict outbreak by 
5.68% at the 0.01 level of significance (Std. Err = 0.0033). Likewise, the single index 
model also implies a 3.37% in conflict probability decrease with a 1% higher amount 
that this year’s precipitation than last year’s. As a consequence, the optimal out-of-
sample forecasting model, selected through a rolling window scheme, suggests that a 
higher level of precipitation this year relative to last will statistically significantly lower 
the risk of civil conflict. 
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Additionally, we find some interesting results when estimating the panel logit 
model, which is displayed in Table 2.
11
 
 
Table 2. Dependent Variable: Conflict Incidence, 1950 – 2006 
Independent Variable Panel Logit Model 
Variation in Temperature at t -0.003 
 
(0.847) 
Variation in Precipitation at t -0.225** 
 
(0.101) 
First Differenced Log(GDP) at t -3.819*** 
 
(0.935) 
Regime Type at t-1 -0.010 
 
(0.033) 
Regime Type Square at t-1 -0.011* 
 
(0.006) 
Log(Population) at t-1 1.640*** 
 
(0.483) 
Observations 3826 
Pseudo_R^2 0.071 
BIC 2565.4 
standard error in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001 
 
 
                                                 
11
 In semiparametric estimation, we set the first component of the coefficient vector equal to one to obtain 
scale normalization. The coefficients therefore are not interpretable, but we calculate the average marginal 
effects (AME) instead, to quantify the impacts of weather variation on conflict incidence. 
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Table 2 shows that the effect of precipitation variation on conflict incidence is 
significantly negative at the level of 0.05. Intuitively, the less the precipitation this year 
relative to the last the higher the probability of civil conflict the country may suffer 
from.
12
 Such a robust result offers strong evidence of a negative relationship between 
precipitation abundance and civil war incidence, which is in line with the findings of 
several other studies (Miguel et al. 2004; Hendrix and Glaser 2007). 
We do not find significant direct correlations between temperature variation and 
civil conflict, albeit the fact that many researchers advocate higher temperature increases 
the risk of conflict (Hsiang et al. 2013; Burke et al. 2009). Additionally, interesting 
findings emerge by looking at other country characteristics. For example, GDP growth 
has statistically significant negative impacts on conflict incidence while population 
shows significant positive effects. That is to say, a country with higher GDP growth and 
less population is less likely to experience civil conflict. In addition, the significant 
coefficient of the squared term of regime type indicates its curvilinear effects on conflict 
incidence, consistent with regimens at either end of the spectrum having less conflict. 
Discussion 
Both parametric and nonparametric estimates yield strong evidence that a lower 
level of precipitation this year relative to last increases the risk of civil conflict. This 
finding indicates that negative precipitation shocks could be drivers of conflict. Climate 
change can contribute to this. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 
                                                 
12
 This conclusion also holds across all the models on sub-samples investigated here. The estimated 
coefficient on precipitation variation remains statistically significant and negative no matter what rolling 
window is applied. 
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2007a, 2013) predicts that total global precipitation will increase as a whole, whereas the 
patterns differ significantly across regions. In addition, variability of rainfall is projected 
to increase with 90% certainty, which may give rise to or intensify extreme events such 
as droughts or flooding. As a consequence, the predictions of increased variability and 
extreme event incidence portend greater conflict incidence. Analytically, suppose 
precipitation follows the normal distribution, with mean μ and standard distribution σ. 
An increase in variability means that the standard distribution σ becomes larger. In other 
words, precipitation data spreads out covering a wider range of values. The probability 
of extreme values (i.e., extreme low precipitation/drought or high precipitation/flood) 
therefore grows. This has implications for policy design regarding climate change and 
conflict.  
Admittedly, apart from the potential drivers of conflict considered in this study, 
there also exist numerous other determinants that make countries (or areas) more 
susceptible to conflict. For instance, economic elements that reflect the development 
level of a nation are closely linked to the risk of conflict. Poverty, economic inequality, 
economic structures such as the primary commodities countries rely on, policies, and the 
like are all examples. Given myriads of potential conflict-inducing factors, we cannot 
conclude that precipitation variation contributes the most to the conflict outbreak. 
Nevertheless, we obtain some major findings as follows.  
First of all, our analysis strongly suggests that efforts in conflict prevention and 
resilience building can be enhanced by several means.  Certainly there is the obvious 
climate change mitigation or adaptation. Additionally, actions such as provision of 
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irrigation or other water supply enhancements would lessen the impact of precipitation 
fluctuations in conflict prone areas at risk of water shortage. Furthermore, forecasts of 
places where climate change would increase the probability of adverse precipitation 
events can help target efforts on pre-conflict peacebuilding interventions, through means 
such as enhancement of adverse event early warning systems, enhanced water supply 
reliability, and drought resistance increases through agricultural research (e.g., drought 
resistant varieties and crops). Moreover, we feel the quantitative analysis may well 
benefit policy-makers and other stakeholders by predicting conflict hot spots in advance 
allowing potential preemptive actions. Second, methodologically we find 
semiparametric models are superior forecasters and this indicates such methods might be 
used in other conflict and climate related analyses.  
Overall, this study has several attributes that advance the current literature. First 
we believe the semiparametric methods – single index models – provide an important 
method for analysis.  In particular following Hristache et al. (2001) and Härdle et al. 
(2004), single index models could increase the flexibility compared with parametric 
models and avoid the “curse of dimensionality”, which is a common issue among fully 
nonparametric models. Second, this study emphasizes models’ predictive performance, 
in an effort to improve the predictive power and possible policy use of the resultant 
model. Lastly but not least, a rolling window approach, which requires repeated 
regressions over a sequence of rolling window with a fixed length, is adopted to achieve 
robust forecasts for model selection. It provides higher flexibility of potential structural 
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changes and thus more sophisticated usage than other models rested on once-off breaks 
(O'Reilly and Whelan 2005). 
There are some limitations of our research worth noting. First, there exist 
numerous other determinants that make countries (or areas) more susceptible to conflict. 
For instance, economic elements that reflect the development level of a nation are 
closely linked to the risk of conflict. Poverty, economic inequality, economic structures 
such as the primary commodities countries rely on, policies, and the like are all 
examples. Given myriads of potential conflict-inducing factors, we cannot conclude that 
precipitation variation contributes the most to the conflict outbreak. Second, because we 
use reduced-form methods, our research cannot fully reveal or distinguish the climate-
conflict mechanisms underlying the relationship. Consequently, extensions are essential 
to further illuminate the precise causal pathway, allowing one to tailor more efficient and 
effective localized policies as discussed in Miguel et al. (2004) and Burke et al. (2014). 
Third, our estimation results reveal short-run linkages and additional work might be 
done on long-run impacts considering possible adaptation (Dell et al. 2014). 
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CHAPTER III 
A CAUSAL EXPLORATION OF CONFLICT EVENTS AND 
COMMODITY PRICES OF SUDAN

 
Introduction 
Higher food prices have detrimental consequences on the socio-political events 
in developing countries (FAO–SIFSIA 2012) and have been shown to be related to 
civilian unrest as well (Bellemare 2011; Besley and Persson 2008; Goldstone 1982; Lagi 
et al. 2011; Smith 2014). World food prices surged to a record high in February 2011, 
which served as a catalyst for a series of protests in North Africa and the Middle East, 
including the 2011 “Arab Spring” (Bellemare 2011; Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). 
Although recent literature establishes causal linkages between food prices and conflict, 
the direction of the causality is still unclear. Provided that food prices continue to stay 
high, its causal direction and shock responses of conflict remain a germane investigation. 
Our study contributes to this strand of studies by investigating the causal relationships of 
staple commodity prices and conflict events in Sudan. Using Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) techniques and modern innovations of computer science search 
algorithms, we discover that commodity prices, especially imported ones, drive conflict 
events in Sudan. 
                                                 

 Reprinted with permission from “A Causal Exploration of Food Price Shocks and Conflict in Sudan” by 
Chen, J., S. R Kibriya. D.A. Bessler, and E.C. Price, Presented at Agricultural and Applied Economics 
Association & Western Agricultural Economics Association Joint Annual Meeting, California, 2015. 
Copyright [2015] by AAEA. 
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Consistent with the general experience in the developing world, the prices of 
staple foods in Sudan increased alarmingly in 2008 (FAO–SIFSIA 2012). The region has 
been beleaguered by intense armed conflict in recent years. Particularly, Sudan’s second 
civil war (1983 – 2005) is characterized as one of longest enduring, catastrophic wars 
during the late 20th century (Say et al. 2012). On July 9, after the referendum in January 
2011, South Sudan seceded from Sudan and became an independent country, indicating 
the end of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed in 2005 
(FAO/WFP 2014). Despite the independence and enduring efforts at stabilization, Sudan 
remains volatile due to the frequency of low-medium level conflict onsets (Raleigh et al. 
2010). Recent literature shows numerous factors driving conflict: growing population 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004), natural resource endowments (Collier and Hoeffler 1998), 
economic conditions such as income levels and economic growth (Berazneva and Lee 
2013; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Miguel et al. 2004), fragile institutions and 
geographical attributes (Blattman and Miguel 2010), quick and significant demographic 
changes such as migration (Goldstone 2002). However, a time variant examination of 
the topic is yet to be conducted. With the existing inequality and unrest across regions, 
the soaring food prices could exacerbate the weak purchasing power of its citizens 
(IFAD 2009). Given the conflict onsets, rising food prices and low political stability in 
the region, Sudan is an ideal country to investigate the dynamic relationships between 
cereal prices and conflict. 
Sorghum, millet, and wheat are the main cereals consumed in Sudan (Hamid 
2003). Sorghum is the highest consumed commodity followed by wheat and millet. 
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Sudan is self-sustainable in sorghum and millet production (Abdelrahman 1998), while it 
at most produces 20% of its net wheat demand (FAO/WFP 2011). Consumption of these 
cereals differs by regions and socio-economic status of the citizens. Sorghum serves as 
the main staple for the most impoverished in central and eastern Sudan, while millet is 
the staple for most people in Darfur and some regions in the western Sudan (FEWS NET 
2014a). In current times, wheat is usually treated as a substitute for sorghum and millet 
in northern Sudan, especially in the urban areas (Mustafa et al. 2013; FEWS NET 
2014a). Mustafa et al. (2013) report that the average consumption of wheat has increased 
to 1770.8 thousand tons in the 2000s from 743.5 thousand tons in the 1980s. 
Consequently, imports of wheat have increased substantially since 1999, and the imports 
amount accounted for about 75 percent of the wheat consumption from 2000 to 2010 
(Mustafa et al. 2013). Increased imports caused higher price volatility and government 
intervention. Furthermore, the high volume of wheat imports absorbs almost all of the 
foreign exchange generated from total agricultural exports (Auad et al. 2007). 
In a recent report, Famine Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET 2014b) 
reports that 3.3 million people would face stressed and crisis levels of food insecurity, 
mainly caused by increasing food prices and conflict. Mahran (1996) approaches this 
topic from demand and supply perspective. Misselhorn (2005), using meta-analysis 
based on 49 household economy local-level studies, reveals the causes of food insecurity 
in southern Africa including conflict, poverty, and environmental factors. Hadley et al. 
(2012) conduct twenty semi-structured interviews in Africa and conclude that the rise in 
food prices could decrease food security, including non-nutritional results. Given 
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previous studies and reports, it is plausible to draw the conjecture that rising cereal 
prices, violent activities, and the food shortage in Sudan are not unrelated. However, 
contemporary research does not draw direct time variant inference between food prices 
and conflict, especially in the Sudanese context. We address this gap in the literature by 
studying a time series dataset on commodity prices and conflict events in Sudan. In this 
article, we attempt to use Inductive Causation (IC) methods (Spirtes et al. 2000) to 
inform us on contemporaneous structure. Our treatment of the non-Gaussian commodity 
treatment is different from the contemporary social science literature, as we employ 
Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model. We use a Bernanke-like Structure Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) model to summarize the dynamic causal relationships between 
commodity prices and conflict. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 
III.2 provides a literature review on the relationship of food prices and conflict; Chapter 
III.3 introduces the major methodology applied; Chapter III.4 describes the dataset; 
Chapter III.5 presents the results of estimation and Chapter III.6 summarizes the 
conclusion and provides some policy implications. 
Background and Literature Review 
Current literature offers ample evidence of linkages between increasing food 
prices and conflict. While rising food prices may not be the direct drivers for conflict, 
they may well be latent drivers of conflict. High food prices increase food insecurity and 
can lead to social and political instability and conflict. A reverse causal flow can be 
argued as well. The outbreak of conflict may increase food prices because of radical 
ramifications such as increasing disease, death and displacement, soaring military 
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expense, and capital damages (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). The following offers 
further theoretical and empirical evidence of both directions. 
Food Prices (Market) Affecting Conflict 
The impoverished suffer the most from high food prices. For instance, in Africa, 
the under privileged spend almost half of their income on food (Smith 2013). Goldstone 
(1982) suggests that food protests often erupt with high unemployment and increases in 
food prices. Walton and Seddon (2008) find that food riots surged in the 1970s, due to 
the integrated world economy where local food prices were more influenced by global 
political economy (Bellemare 2011). Besley and Persson (2008) study civil war and 
conclude that higher world market export and import prices increase the probability of 
civil unrest. Similarly, Lagi et al. (2011) suggest that global food price peaks, beyond a 
certain threshold, could trigger social unrest with other possible contributing factors. 
Taking into account other determinants including government interventions, other 
pertinent research suggest that higher commodity prices are correlated with conflict in 
developing countries (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). Recently, Smith (2014) utilizes an 
instrumental variable approach and concludes that in urban Africa a sudden surge of 
domestic food prices contributes to civil unrest. Nevertheless, some scholars argue the 
same causal direction with different effects. Demuynck and Schollaert (2008) 
demonstrate that a fall of tropical agricultural commodities’ prices could fuel conflict by 
instigating a rebellion. Similarly, Brückner and Ciccone (2010) show that a drop in 
commodity prices increases the probability of civil war. 
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Conflict Affecting Food Prices 
Conflict events tend to impede food production, input supplies, and output 
storage (Hitzhusen and Jeanty 2006). Consequently, slight changes in supply could 
greatly affect prices since the demand for food is essentially inelastic. Therefore, conflict 
and its associated political and social instability could drive food prices (Brinkman and 
Hendrix 2011). Sufficient evidence indicates that socio‐political events and wars, 
especially armed conflict and terrorism, usually have significant effects on markets 
(Kollias et al. 2011). Guidolin and La (2010) study a large sample of internal and inter-
state conflict events and conclude that national stock markets tend to perform positively 
when there is an onset of conflict rather than responding negatively. 
To summarize, not only can high food prices lead to conflict, but also conflict 
could contribute to high food prices. For instance, riots swept through the Middle East 
and North Africa, partly resulting from high food prices. In turn, the insecurity 
afterwards disrupted the commodity markets (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). The vicious 
cycle can cause even higher food prices and more intense conflict events. 
Methodology 
As our data on commodity prices and the number of conflict events are observed 
in time sequence. Recent explorations of such time variant data on commodity prices 
include time series analysis of food and energy prices in India by Bhatt and Kishor 
(2015) and US food prices by Lambert and Miljkovic (2010). We augment their 
approach by considering a structural representation and employing a non-Gaussian 
graphical network based algorithm to identify contemporaneous causation. We study the 
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co-movement of commodity prices and conflict events through time with the vector 
autoregression (VAR) model. We follow Hsiao (1979) and construct a subset vector 
autoregression model to capture the relationship between the current position of 
commodity prices and conflict events combined with their lagged values, allowing for 
asymmetric lag length structure. In addition, new information in each period 
(innovations) is then modeled using methods from machine learning as first suggested in 
Swanson and Granger (1997), giving us a structural representation of commodity prices 
and conflict events in contemporaneous time (a structural VAR). 
Vector Autoregression Model 
Empirical Strategy 
The unrestricted Vector Autoregression (VAR) (Sims 1980) allows every 
variable to affect every other variable in a system of equations with lags of the same 
length, whereas the subset VAR permits a differential lag structure among variables of 
the system. For example, variable 𝑦1𝑡 may affect variable 𝑦2𝑡 with one lag, whereas it 
may affect variable 𝑦3𝑡 with three lags. Justification for permitting such differences 
relates to both estimation efficiency and forecasting accuracy (Briiggemann and 
Liitkepohl 2001). Sims (1980) labels the unrestricted VAR as a profligately 
parameterized model. The subset VAR can be treated as the traditional VAR, subject to 
zero restrictions (determined from data) on certain coefficients of lagged variables 
(𝑦𝑡−1, 𝑦𝑡−2, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝). Hsiao (1979) offers a procedure for placement of these zero 
restrictions (reviewed below).  
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Following Moneta et al. (2013), the basic structural VAR in matrix form is given 
as: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵0𝑦𝑡 + 𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐵𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (3.1) 
where 𝑦𝑡 (𝑘 × 1) is a vector of k endogenous variables observed at time t. In this 
paper, 𝑦𝑡 represents wheat price, sorghum price, millet price and number of conflict 
events (𝑘 = 4). The variable 𝑥𝑡 (𝑑 × 1) is a vector of exogenous variables at time t. We 
use a set of eleven monthly binary variables to capture seasonal effects. The 
matrices  𝐵𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝) are coefficients to be estimated, each associated with a 
particular lag of the left hand side endogenous variable 𝑦𝑡. The index p refers to the 
maximum number of lags generating our system (as we are considering the subset VAR, 
𝑝 lags may not be the same for all elements of the vector 𝑦𝑡). The matrix 𝐵0 represents 
contemporaneous coefficient matrix, with a zero for each element of the main diagonal. 
The vector 𝜀𝑡 is a (𝑘 × 1) series of white noise innovations, where 𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑠
′) = 𝛴, if 𝑡 =
𝑠, and 0 otherwise. As in Moneta et al. (2013), we further assume that the innovations 
(𝜀1, … , 𝜀𝑘) in equation (3.1) are independent sources of new information (independent of 
each other, so an information shock in series 1, say wheat price, is independent of an 
information shock from series 2, say sorghum price). 
Equation (3.1) is termed a structural VAR, as elements of the matrix 𝐵0 are not 
necessarily all zero. It is of particular interest in this study to know which off diagonal 
elements are non-zero (structural information). The main reason for this is that we have 
monthly period of observation (monthly data), and potentially a considerable amount of 
inter-series interaction, can take place within the month. For instance, wheat price may 
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well affect millet or sorghum prices and these in turn affect conflict events within the 
month (actually days, but such data are not available). 
The model offered in equation (3.1) can be reformed as a standard VAR. This is, 
perhaps, most easily seen via two steps. First move the contemporaneous value of 𝑦𝑡 in 
equation (3.1) to the left hand side of the equation to get equation (3.2): 
(𝐼 − 𝐵0)𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐵𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐵𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (3.2) 
Finally merely solve equation (3.2) for 𝑦𝑡. This operation gives us equation (3.3), 
the reduced form VAR (or subset VAR if the 𝐵𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝) matrices contain nonzero 
elements somewhere).  
𝑦𝑡 = (𝐼 − 𝐵0)
−1𝐵1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + (𝐼 − 𝐵0)
−1𝐵𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + (𝐼 − 𝐵0)
−1𝐵𝑥𝑡 + (𝐼 − 𝐵0)
−1𝜀𝑡 
     = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝐴𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡         (3.3) 
Here ut is a vector of white noise innovation process in which its covariance 
matrix 𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡
′) = 𝛴𝑢 is not necessarily diagonal. Notice the innovation vector 𝑢𝑡 is now 
a combination of the original independent shocks 𝜀𝑡: 𝑢𝑡 = (𝐼 − 𝐵0)
−1𝜀𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡. 
Our goal is to estimate the reduced form VAR in equation (3.3) and then offer 
evidence on the particular contemporaneous structural ordering behind the matrix 𝐴0
−1 . 
This problem was first described and its solution was hinted at in the paper by Swanson 
and Granger (1997). Bessler and Akleman (1998) offer the first data-based solution to 
this task, which followed the suggestions provided in Swanson and Granger (1997). 
When specifying the SVAR in this paper, the method of search proposed by 
Hsiao (1979) using the Hannan-Quinn (Hannan and Quinn 1979) loss criterion will be 
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employed to determine the optimal lag length of each variable in each equation (3.3).
13 
Hsiao’s method is an iterative procedure to specify the optimal lag length of each 
variable in each equation separately for more efficient estimations. However, this 
technique is sensitive to the rank of the importance of the independent variables 
considered, which rests on prior theory (Kling and Bessler 1985). 
The Identification of SVAR 
Since the lag structures suggested by the SVAR (equation (3.3)) are usually 
complex and difficult to interpret, we consider the corresponding vector Moving 
Average (MA) representation. We follow the presentation in Moneta et al. (2013): 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑢𝑡−𝑗
∞
𝑗=0 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗𝐴0𝐴0
−1𝑢𝑡−𝑗
∞
𝑗=0 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛹𝑗𝜀𝑡−𝑗
∞
𝑗=0     (3.4)
14
 
where the matrix 𝜑𝑗 and 𝛹𝑗(= 𝜑𝑗𝐴0) represent the moving average parameters and the 
impulse response from 𝑦𝑡 to the shocks 𝜀𝑡−𝑗 respectively; 𝜇 is the mean of 𝑦𝑡. One 
advantage of SVAR is to render sufficient information for policy analysis, such as 𝛹𝑗 . 
Thus, it is vital to obtain the matrix 𝐴0, which completes the transformation from 𝑢𝑡 (not 
orthogonal information shocks) to 𝜀𝑡 (orthogonal information shocks). Usually, the 
constraint that the contemporaneous causal structures among variables of interest 
(𝑦1𝑡, 𝑦2𝑡, … , 𝑦𝑘𝑡) should be acyclic is imposed. This implies that 𝐴0 is lower triangular 
(Moneta et al. 2013). In the following section, we will summarize a data-based method 
                                                 
13
 Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ) is computed as follows: HQ= ln|| + 2kln(lnT)/T, where  is the 
estimated non-orthogonal innovations correlation matrix from a first estimated VAR (equation (3.3)), k is 
the number of parameters fit and T is the number of observations. Other information criteria (Schwarz 
loss) were also studied and gave similar results. 
14
 Note that the exogenous variables (seasonal dummy variables) are excluded from this equation (3.4), 
suggested by Hsiao-search method when we specify the SVAR model. 
 42 
 
to detect the causal structure among the variables in the vector 𝑦𝑡, instead of treating 
such a structure as a priori determined. Besides this assumption, the non-normality of the 
innovation terms is also needed in order to make full use of higher-order statistics of the 
variables. 
The Innovation Accounting Techniques 
Innovation accounting techniques serve as useful tools to depict the dynamic 
interaction among variables. One such approach is the impulse response function (IRF), 
which describes how every series in the system responds to a one-time-only shock in 
each series. However, considering the case studied in the present paper, a better 
summary of the moving average representation (equation (3.4)) is the Forecast Error 
Variance Decompositions (FEVD). FEVD assesses the relative importance of each series 
(wheat, sorghum, and millet prices and conflict events) on each other at different 
horizons (distances into the future).The premise of implementing the innovation 
accounting methods above is orthogonal error covariance. Swanson and Granger (1997) 
point out that FEVD can only be easily understood regarding to the orthogonalized 
innovations. To obtain orthogonal innovations, early studies apply a Cholesky 
factorization to the contemporaneous innovation covariance matrix. Unfortunately, 
different orderings lead to different conclusions on the innovation accounting analysis 
(Bessler 1984). An alternative, Bernanke Decomposition approach (Bernanke 1986) is 
employed in this study, which relaxes the just-identified structure assumption for the 
VAR residuals. To discover the causal structure among the four variables in 
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contemporaneous time, directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), with the linear non-Gaussian 
acyclic model (LiNGAM) search algorithm are used. 
Linear Non Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM) 
A contemporaneous causal structure reveals the joint distribution of the variables 
observed as well as measures and forecasts the consequence of drivers (Shimizu et al. 
2006). Several search algorithms have been used by contemporary researchers: PC 
algorithm (Spirtes et al. 2000), Greedy Equivalence Search (GES) algorithm (Chickering 
2003), Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM) algorithm (Shimizu et al. 2006), 
etc. PC algorithm has been widely used and it assumes Gaussian data in tests of 
conditional independence. Consequently, it may not be able to identify a unique matrix 
𝐴0. GES algorithm relies on variance-covariance to attempt a structural identification of 
𝐴0 , leading again to a plethora of observationally equivalent structures (alternative 𝐴0 
matrices which cannot be distinguished from one another based on the data). Moreover, 
the assumption of the Gaussian distributed innovations is usually not the case in most 
empirical studies (Moneta et al. 2013). 
In this paper, we utilize Independent Component Analysis (ICA)-based 
LiNGAM to discover the causal structure under the assumption behind model in 
equation (3.4) – no hidden confounders and reduced form innovation terms with non-
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Gaussian distributions (Shimizu et al. 2006).
15
 The model is presented as follows 
(following Shimizu et al. (2006)): 
𝑢𝑖 = ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑗𝑘(𝑗)<𝑘(𝑖) + 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖          (3.5) 
where 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑝} denotes the observed innovations from an estimated form of 
equation (3.4), which can be organized in a causal order 𝑘(𝑖). That is, only the earlier 
variable could affect the later variable, not vice versa. Coefficient 𝑏𝑖𝑗 summarizes the 
causal effect from variable 𝑢𝑗  to 𝑢𝑖 , 𝑒𝑖 represents the non-Gaussian, mutually 
independent innovations and ci is constant. The relationship in equation (3.5) can be 
graphically reflected by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with vertices 𝑢𝑖 and edges – 
non-zero 𝑏𝑖𝑗. 
Removing the mean of each variable 𝑢𝑖, then the equation (3.5) can be 
transformed into the matrix representation: 
𝑢 = 𝐵𝑢 + 𝑒             (3.6) 
where B represents the coefficient matrix, which could be permutated to strict lower 
triangular form according to the causal ordering 𝑘(𝑖). Denote 𝐴 = (𝐼 − 𝐵)−1, then  
𝑢 = 𝐴𝑒             (3.7) 
where 𝐴 could also be permutated to lower triangular form.16 
                                                 
15
 In fact, LiNGAM is mainly for the continuous-valued data (Shimizu et al. 2006). Even though the 
values in the series of conflict events range as integers from 0 to 154, they cover many different values. 
Thus, still we can manipulate LiNGAM. 
16
 Different from “strict lower triangular matrix”, some diagonal elements could be zero in low triangular 
matrix. 
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Independent component analysis (ICA) (Hyvärinen et al. 2004), a technique of 
uncovering non-Gaussian hidden factors, plays a crucial role in LiNGAM. Following 
Shimizu (2014), ICA can be expressed as: 
𝑢 = 𝐴𝑠             (3.8) 
where u and s stand for the observed variables (𝑢) and the independent components 
(information shocks). The elements 𝑠𝑗 in s are mutually independent latent variables, 
with non-Gaussian distributions (the independent components). 
As a result, the equation (3.7) symbolizes the linear independent component 
analysis (ICA) model (3.8). ICA makes use of non-Gaussianity to estimate the mixing 
matrix A given the linear and ample observed data u. Moreover, the fix-point algorithms 
proposed by Hyvärinen (1999) can be applied to estimate A efficiently, such as 
‘FastICA’ algorithm (Moneta et al. 2013). After obtaining the estimated matrix 𝐴, we 
can calculate the coefficient matrix B. Nonetheless, the order and scaling of the 
independent components are left to be determined. The detailed operations can be 
referred to Shimizu et al. (2006) and Shimizu (2014). Finally, knowing the vertex and 
causal order, we can draw a complete DAG. LiNGAM is an attractive algorithm for the 
present study since it accommodates non-Gaussian innovations, allowing us to identify 
complete causal structure without prior knowledge. As will be demonstrated below, our 
data are highly non-Gaussian. 
Data 
For this research we use data on commodity prices and conflict events of Sudan 
from January 2001 to December 2012. The information on wheat, sorghum and millet 
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prices is collected from Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) Food 
Price Data and Analysis Tool, Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations. The GIEWS database reports monthly prices of these commodities from the 
Khartoum port. 
The data for the number of conflict events are obtained from Armed Conflict 
Location & Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010) over the same period. The 
ACLED database provides disaggregated conflict analysis and crisis in African 
countries. It collects comprehensive real-time data on political violence in Africa, 
including the exact dates and locations of conflict events, the types of event, the groups 
involved, fatalities, and changes in territorial control. The data statistics description is 
given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Summary Statistics on Wheat Price, Sorghum Price, Millet Price and 
Conflict Events in Sudan; 2001.1 – 2012.12 Monthly Data 
Series Units Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Wheat Price Sudanese Pound/90kg 98.466 38.109 0.387 
Sorghum 
Price 
Sudanese Pound/90kg 74.377 40.418 0.543 
Millet Price Sudanese Pound/90kg 108.250 62.375 0.576 
Conflict 
Events 
Number of 
Conflicts/Month 
22.868 21.084 0.922 
 
To present a more direct visual understanding, plots of the time series data are 
displayed in Figure 3. A common characteristic the price of wheat, sorghum, and millet 
share is an upward trend, which may indicate that they are not stable. The number of 
conflict events in Sudan seems stable, except for a peak between 2011 and 2012. 
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Figure 3. Plots of Wheat Price, Sorghum Price, Millet Price and Conflict Events in 
Sudan; 2001 - 2012, Monthly Data 
 
 
Result 
Stationarity 
VAR model is applied to describe the dynamic interrelationship among 
stationary variables. That is, any particular variable measured over time should be tied to 
its mean. Otherwise, it will lead spurious regression if we fail to balance the series’ order 
on the both sides of the equation (Bessler and Kling 1984). Therefore, the first and 
necessary step in time-series analysis should be to examine if the levels of each series 
are stationary. One standard unit-root test procedure — Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test is applied to check whether the four series (wheat price, sorghum price, 
millet price, and conflict events in Sudan) are stationary or not. The null hypothesis is 
that there exists a unit root (nonstationary). ADF test statistics suggest that three 
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commodity price series are I(1) at the 5% significance level, while the conflict events in 
Sudan is I(0). They are consistent with the visual judgment suggested by Figure 3. 
Model Specification and Structure Test 
The optimal lag length in each equation is chosen by the Hannan and Quinn 
measure with the Hsiao-Search method. Regression Analysis of Time Series (RATS) 
software is implemented for the estimation of SVAR model. However, according to the 
plots of the innovations from the estimation of SVAR, we find some jumps in the 
conflict events series between 2011 and 2012 (which indicates potential heterogeneity). 
Therefore, a structural breakpoint during this period (January 2001 – December 2012) is 
possible, which may be due to the regime changes occurring in Sudan (July 2011).In 
order to test this hypothesis, the Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) procedures are applied. As 
a result, the “conflict events” series suggest a structural break in September, 2011, where 
we also observe a peak in the corresponding innovation series. Additionally, the other 
three series do not indicate the necessity of any breakpoints. Interestingly, the 95% 
confidence interval provided by the Bai-Perron test ranges from July 2011 to October 
2011, which is consistent with regime changes in Sudan.
17
 
Estimation Results of SVAR 
With the same techniques (Hsiao search algorithm with H&Q criteria), the 
optimal lags for each equation are selected and the results are presented in Table 4 to 
Table 7. 
                                                 
17
 South Sudan seceded from Sudan on July 9, 2011, which is likely to influence the structural of the 
conflict events time series. 
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Table 4. Hsiao Search on Specification of Wheat Price 
HQ Constant 
Seasonal 
Dummies 
Lags of  
Wheat Price 
Lags of  
Sorghum Price 
Lags of  
Millet Price 
Lags of  
Conflict Events 
   -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 
6.701 X                  
6.974 X X                 
4.600* X  X                
4.623 X  X X               
4.610 X  X X X              
4.635 X  X X X X             
4.626 X  X    X            
4.653 X  X    X X           
4.672 X  X    X X X          
4.698 X  X    X X X X         
4.622 X  X        X        
4.646 X  X        X X       
4.668 X  X        X X X      
4.655 X  X        X X X X     
4.618 X  X            X    
4.644 X  X            X X   
4.660 X  X            X X X  
4.673 X  X            X X X X 
Each row represents an alternative specification of the dynamic representation of wheat price (in current time) as a function of a constant 
only, a constant and 11 seasonal dummy variables, a constant and lags of wheat price, sorghum price, millet price or conflict events. HQ 
represents Hannan and Quinn criteria. We select that model specification that minimizes HQ. We report only four lags of each variable 
here, in actuality we search over twelve lags of each. All HQ measures on the unreported lags are higher than metrics shown in the table. 
An asterisk (*) indicates minimum.
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Table 5. Hsiao Search on Specification of Sorghum Price 
HQ Constant 
Seasonal 
Dummies 
Lags of  
Sorghum Price 
Lags of  
Millet Price 
Lags of  
Wheat Price 
Lags of  
Conflict Events 
   -1 -2 -4 -5 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 
6.756 X                  
7.037 X X                 
4.313 X  X                
4.313 X  X X               
4.290 X  X X X              
4.290
18
* X  X X X X             
4.297 X  X X X X X            
4.322 X  X X X X X X           
4.342 X  X X X X X X X          
4.354 X  X X X X X X X X         
4.298 X  X X X X     X        
4.325 X  X X X X     X X       
4.317 X  X X X X     X X X      
4.310 X  X X X X     X X X X     
4.314 X  X X X X         X    
4.341 X  X X X X         X X   
4.337 X  X X X X         X X X  
4.364 X  X X X X         X X X X 
Each row represents an alternative specification of the dynamic representation of sorghum price (in current time) as a function of a 
constant only, a constant and 11 seasonal dummy variables, a constant and lags of wheat price, sorghum price, millet prices or conflict 
events. HQ represents Hannan and Quinn criteria. We select that model specification that minimizes HQ. We report only four lags of each 
variable here, in actuality we search over twelve lags of each. All HQ measures on the unreported lags are higher than metrics shown in 
the table. An asterisk (*) indicates minimum. 
                                                 
18
 It is 4.2895 if four digits are kept. Thus, it is the minimum. 
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Table 6. Hsiao Search on Specification of Millet Price 
HQ Constant 
Seasonal 
Dummies 
Lags of  
Millet Price 
Lags of  
Sorghum Price 
Lags of  
Wheat Price 
Lags of  
Conflict Events 
   -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 
7.375 X                  
7.649 X X                 
4.999 X  X                
5.012 X  X X               
5.036 X  X X X              
5.061 X  X X X X             
5.014 X  X    X            
5.020 X  X    X X           
5.038 X  X    X X X          
5.065 X  X    X X X X         
4.979* X  X        X        
5.005 X  X        X X       
5.013 X  X        X X X      
4.990 X  X        X X X X     
5.005 X  X        X    X    
5.030 X  X        X    X X   
5.031 X  X        X    X X X  
5.048 X  X        X    X X X X 
Each row represents an alternative specification of the dynamic representation of millet price (in current time) as a function of a constant 
only, a constant and 11 seasonal dummy variables, a constant and lags of wheat price, sorghum price, millet price or conflict events. HQ 
represents Hannan and Quinn criteria. We select that model specification that minimizes HQ. We report only four lags of each variable 
here, in actuality we search over twelve lags of each. All HQ measures on the unreported lags are higher than metrics shown in the table. 
An asterisk (*) indicates minimum. 
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Table 7. Hsiao Search on Specification of Conflict Events 
HQ Constant 
Seasonal 
Dummies 
Lags of  
Conflict Events 
Lags of  
Wheat Price 
Lags of  
Sorghum Price 
Lags of  
Millet Price 
   -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 -1 -2 -3 -4 
4.981 X                  
5.208 X X                 
4.571 X  X                
4.597 X  X X               
4.617 X  X X X              
4.641 X  X X X X             
4.550* X  X    X            
4.571 X  X    X X           
4.597 X  X    X X X          
4.618 X  X    X X X X         
4.574 X  X    X    X        
4.585 X  X    X    X X       
4.611 X  X    X    X X X      
4.632 X  X    X    X X X X     
4.573 X  X    X        X    
4.600 X  X    X        X X   
4.625 X  X    X        X X X  
4.623 X  X    X        X X X X 
Each row represents an alternative specification of the dynamic representation of conflict events (in current time) as a function of a 
constant only, a constant and 11 seasonal dummy variables, a constant and lags of wheat price, sorghum price, millet price or conflict 
events. HQ represents Hannan and Quinn criteria. We select that model specification that minimizes HQ. We report only four lags of each 
variable here, in actuality we search over twelve lags of each. All HQ measures on the unreported lags are higher than metrics shown in 
the table. An asterisk (*) indicates minimum. 
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Then, we regress the SVAR model again from January 2001 to September 2011, 
with robust variance-covariance matrix considering the possible heteroscedasticity.
19
 
The estimation results of the SVAR model specified above are listed in Table 8.  
According to Table 8, each variable’s own one period lag could exert statistically 
significant and positive effect on itself at the 1% level. Wheat price shows up 
significantly (5% level) in the millet price equation, whereas it is not the case for the 
other commodity prices in some other price series. In terms of the relationship between 
commodity prices and conflict events, only one period lagged wheat price has a 
significantly positive effect on the number of conflict events in Sudan. These results 
seem to suggest that wheat price is the most significant in this particular system. We will 
take advantage of the innovation techniques shown below to depict the dynamic 
relationship among the variables of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 We also estimate the same model from 2001.1 to 2011.7, and from 2001.1 to 2011.10, which were the 
confidence limits of the 95% level (i.e., the lower and upper boundaries of the confidence interval) 
suggested by the Bai-Perron test. The results are not reported here but available upon request. 
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Table 8. Estimate Result on SVAR, 2001.1 – 2011.9, Monthly Data 
Dependent Variable   Variable Coeff Std. Error T-Stat Signif 
Wheat Price (WT) 1 Constant 4.758  3.016  1.578  0.115  
  2 WT{1} 0.957  0.037  26.083  0.000  
Sorghum Price (SOR)   Variable Coeff Std.Error T-Stat Signif 
  1 Constant 3.238  1.662  1.948  0.051  
  2 SOR{1} 0.827  0.131  6.298  0.000  
  3 SOR{2} 0.381  0.162  2.348  0.019  
  4 SOR{3} -0.086  0.195  -0.439  0.660  
  5 SOR{4} -0.329  0.123  -2.666  0.008  
  6 SOR{5} 0.164  0.108  1.514  0.130  
Millet Price (MIL)   Variable Coeff Std.Error T-Stat Signif 
  1 Constant -1.277  2.665  -0.479  0.632  
  2 WT{1} 0.144  0.070  2.050  0.040  
  3 MIL{1} 0.883  0.058  15.160  0.000  
Conflict Events (CE)   Variable Coeff Std.Error T-Stat Signif 
  1 Constant 1.785  3.212  0.556  0.579  
  2 WT{1} 0.078  0.039  2.009  0.045  
  3 CE{1} 0.544  0.075  7.290  0.000  
 
The plots of the innovations derived from the SVAR above are presented in 
Figure 4. Additionally, applying ADF test on these innovations suggests that all the 
residual series are stationary. 
 
 55 
 
 
Figure 4. Plots on Innovations from a SVAR on Wheat Price, Sorghum Price, 
Millet Price and Conflict Events; 2001.1 – 2011.9, Monthly Data 
 
 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) Results 
DAGs are employed to discover the causal flows on the contemporary 
innovations from the SVAR (January 2001 – September 2011) above. DAGs are 
available in the software TETRAD V (Ramsey et al. 2013). We fit the models 
summarized from Table 4 to Table 7 equation by equation using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and a system using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The innovations 
from each procedure are quite similar and most importantly, the graph structures from 
both OLS and SUR innovations are the same. 
Normality Test Results 
To decide the specific search algorithm for analyzing our estimated innovations, 
we investigate if the innovations (errors) follow Gaussian distributions. PC (or GES) 
algorithm requires that the residuals from the SVAR model are Gaussian distributed 
 56 
 
(normal distributed), whereas LiNGAM assumes that at most one residual follows 
Gaussian distribution. Therefore, normality tests including skewness test, kurtosis test, 
and Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and Bera 1980, 1987) are executed for each innovation 
series derived from the SVAR. The Jarque-Bera test statistic is chi-squared distributed 
with two degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis that the data are normally 
distributed (i.e., for normal distribution, skewness is 0 and kurtosis is 3, or equivalently 
the excess kurtosis is 0). We present the test for normality results in Table 9. 
From Table 9, we observe that skewness statistics do not exhibit strong evidence 
of significant asymmetric property (only the innovations of the conflict events reject the 
null hypothesis at the 1% significance level); the kurtosis statistics indicate peaks for 
only in sorghum and millet price innovation series at the 1% significance level. Finally, 
and most importantly, all of the Jarque-Bera test statistics, considering both skewness 
and kurtosis together, exceed the critical value at the 1% significance level, except the 
residuals from the wheat price (at the 10% significance level). The normality tests 
suggest that each innovation series has non-normal distribution, albeit the relatively 
weak evidence for the non-Gaussian distribution in wheat price innovations. Therefore 
we use LiNGAM search algorithm to explore the contemporaneous causal structure.
20
 
 
                                                 
20
 In fact, in the case of unique Gaussian component, the model can still be estimated with LiNGAM given 
that the exclusive Gaussian part cannot interact with any other components with non-Gaussian distribution 
(Hyvärinen et al. 2004). 
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Table 9. Normality Tests for the Innovations, 2001.1 – 2011.9 Monthly Data 
Variables 
Skewness
21 Kurtosis 
(excess)
22 Jarque-Bera
23 
(P-Value) (P-Value) (P-Value) 
Wheat Price 
0.297 0.873 5.431 
(0.196) (0.061) (0.066) 
Sorghum Price 
0.070 2.872 40.294 
(0.761) (0.000) (0.000) 
Millet Price 
0.341 1.927 20.380 
(0.137) (0.000) (0.000) 
Conflict Events 
0.721 0.745 12.832 
(0.002) (0.111) (0.002) 
 
 
LiNGAM Algorithm Results 
The DAG found summarizing the causal structure for the four variables is 
displayed in Figure 5.
24
 New information stemming from commodity market has an 
effect on conflict situation in Sudan: the innovations of wheat price could affect 
innovations in conflict events through sorghum price. Figure 5 also indicates that wheat 
price is exogenous. Wheat price will influence the innovations in other cereal prices and 
conflict events in Sudan directly or indirectly, indicating that wheat market is the 
dominant market. In addition, among the three commodity prices, directed edges 
(information flows) are also observed from wheat price to millet price and from sorghum 
                                                 
21
 Skewness test is a test of symmetry of the probability distribution of a random variable (the null 
hypothesis is skewness: 0). 
22
 Krutosis test is a test of peakedness of the probability distribution of a random variable (the null 
hypothesis is kurtosis = 3 or excess kurtosis = 0). 
23
 Jarque-Bera test is a normality test of innovations, taking into account of both skewness and kurtosis. 
Details can refer to Jarque and Bera (1980, 1987). 
24
 The graph structure is found using LiNGAM algorithm found on the Carnegie Mellon, Department of 
Philosophy, TETRAD homepage: http:///www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/tetrad 
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price to millet price. The positive relationship is given on each arrow, indicating that 
cereals are substitutes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Pattern of Causal Flow among Innovations in Wheat Price, Sorghum 
Price, Millet Price and Conflict Events Based on LiNGAM, SVAR 
 
 
Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVD) 
With the contemporary causal relationships displayed above (Figure 5), we 
perform Bernanke factorization (see Estima’s description of this software procedure 
embedded in RATS (Doan 2010)). The corresponding FEVD results are shown in Table 
10. The uncertainty in each series at horizons 0, 1, 2 and 12 months ahead is measured as 
the column labeled “Standard Error”. This measure is accounted for by innovations in 
each series. We label each series’ contribution under the columns headed by the label 
“Due To”. The sum of entries in any row is 100 (allowing rounding errors). For 
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example, looking ahead 12 months, all of the uncertainty in Conflict Events is accounted 
for by variation in Conflict (87.215%), Wheat Price (12.745%), Sorghum Price 
(0.040%), and Millet Price (0.000%). So wheat price shocks account for part of the 
uncertainty in Conflict Events at the 12-month horizon. 
  
Table 10. Percentage of Forecast Uncertainty Accounted for by Innovations from a 
SVAR in Each Series at Horizons 0, 1, 2, and 12 Months Ahead 
Horizon 
(Months 
Ahead) 
Standard 
Error 
Due to: 
Wheat Price 
Due to: 
Sorghum 
Price 
Due to: 
Millet Price 
Due to: 
Conflict 
Events 
 (Wheat Price) 
0 9.708 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 13.439 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 16.116 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12 27.656 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (Sorghum Price) 
0 7.880 12.181 87.819 0.000 0.000 
1 10.223 12.181 87.819 0.000 0.000 
2 13.223 12.181 87.819 0.000 0.000 
12 24.599 12.181 87.819 0.000 0.000 
 (Millet Price) 
0 11.581 10.958 22.575 66.467 0.000 
1 15.814 15.006 21.549 63.445 0.000 
2 18.803 19.336 20.451 60.213 0.000 
12 33.712 54.143 11.626 34.231 0.000 
 (Conflict Events) 
0 9.345 0.006 0.046 0.000 99.948 
1 10.670 0.561 0.045 0.000 99.394 
2 11.084 1.608 0.045 0.000 98.347 
12 11.926 12.745 0.040 0.000 87.215 
The uncertainty in each series at horizons 0, 1, 2 and 12 months ahead is measured as the column 
labeled “Standard Error”. This measure is accounted for by innovations in each series. We label 
each series’ contribution under the columns headed by the label “Due To”. The sum of entries in 
any row is 100 (allowing rounding errors). For example, looking ahead 12 months, all of the 
uncertainty in Conflict Events is accounted for by variation in Conflict Events 87.215%, Wheat 
Price, 12.745%, Sorghum Price, 0.040% and Millet Price, 0.000%. So Wheat Price shocks 
account for part of the uncertainty in Conflict Events at the 12-month horizon.  
 
Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) illustrates how much of the 
variation in one variable at horizon 𝑡 + 𝑠 can be accounted by the innovations in each 
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variable at horizon 𝑡. Due to the space, we only present the FEVD at horizon 0 
(contemporaneous time), 1, 2, 12 months ahead (i.e., 𝑠 = 0, 1, 2, 12). Generally, within a 
short period (e.g., 0, 1 or 2 months), each variable can be almost explained by the shocks 
from its own history, such as wheat price (100%), sorghum price (87.819%), millet price 
(66.467%), and conflict events (99.948%) in contemporaneous time. However, moving 
to a longer run (12 months), other variables play a more important role in explaining the 
variation in their uncertainty. For instance, wheat price explains as much as 54.143% of 
the price variation in millet at the 12-month horizon, which is much higher than the 
portion it explains in contemporaneous time (10.958%). 
Specifically, wheat is exogenous throughout the12 month horizon, since 100% of 
price volatility can be accounted by innovations in its own market, regardless of 
horizons. Relatively, sorghum is less exogenous, in that around 12% of price volatility is 
explained by innovations in the wheat market. In terms of millet, approximately two 
thirds of its price volatility is attributed to information arising in wheat and sorghum 
markets. At the horizon of 12 months, wheat will account for majority (more than half) 
of the volatility in millet price. The volatility of conflict events in Sudan is primarily 
explained by itself and wheat price (volatility of sorghum price can explain a very small 
part of conflict uncertainty, around 0.045%). Moreover, wheat price will display a 
greater influence on the incidence of conflict events in Sudan as the horizon increases. In 
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sum, the interaction between commodity prices and conflict centers on the interface 
between wheat price and conflict events in Sudan.
25
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper, we attempt to discover the interaction among three major cereal 
prices (wheat, sorghum, and millet) and the onset of conflict events in Sudan, with 
Structure Vector Autoregression (SVAR). Normality tests applied to informational 
innovations suggest that the Linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM) can be 
executed to identify contemporaneous causal structures. The combination of these 
methods enables us to identify the dynamic interaction among three cereal markets and 
conflict events. Specifically, the Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) and the innovation 
accounting techniques (FEVD) suggest that the only linkage between commodity prices 
and conflict events is the shocks from the wheat market on conflict levels, through the 
sorghum market. This impact persists for almost two years, even though it decreases 
over time. Interestingly, as well, we find no feedback from conflict to commodity prices. 
The cereal consumption patterns in Sudan may provide a plausible explanation of 
the causal path uncovered here. Historically sorghum has been the most popular staple 
food of Sudan. In recent years, consumer preferences, especially in urban and peri-urban 
areas have shifted to wheat (Abdelrahman 1998; Mustafa et al. 2013; Jayne et al. 2010). 
In the absence of proportional increase in production of wheat, imports have been the 
primary means of meeting this access demand of wheat. Consequently, the net price of 
                                                 
25
 Results from Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) are consistent with SVAR that cereal prices do 
move conflict, while VECM indicates millet price is the driver of conflict instead of wheat price. Perhaps 
the different results based on different models are due to our modest sample size (144 observations).  
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wheat has also increased. Our empirical results of contemporaneous effects show the 
consequences of this phenomenon. We find that rising wheat price causes sorghum price 
to increase (perhaps due to the weak substitution effects). Our graphical representation 
illustrates that the increase in the cereal prices causes a surge of conflict outbreaks. In 
addition, structural analysis of the data (January 2001 – December 2012) suggests a 
potential breakpoint in September 2011. This coincides with the regime change as Sudan 
after July 2011 was separated from its southern part. 
Considering these results, we offer some policy perspectives and suggestions. As 
imported commodities such as wheat obtains more popularity in Africa, the concern 
regarding self-sufficiency is often disregarded on free market and trade grounds. 
However, policy makers should not ignore that often times African countries lack 
conditions necessary for such an environment (Letiche 2010). Policies including subsidy 
and price regulation may help lower the onset of conflict events to some extent. 
Programs enhancing domestic production of wheat (such as introducing advanced 
technology) are possibly a more sustainable solution. As Mustafa et al. (2013) point out, 
“Wheat production has consistently been supported by government interventions either 
through subsidized inputs or price setting, however, it rarely exceeds 20 percent of the 
domestic requirement (some 1.8 million MT) and the remaining 80 percent is imported 
(FAO/WFP 2011).” If high food prices act as a catalyst for conflict, lowering or keeping 
reasonable food prices and supply with effective policy could reduce the incidence of 
conflict and stabilize countries. A caveat has to be made here. Despite the multifaceted 
and complex links between conflict and commodity prices, we cannot conclude that one 
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is the other’s necessary or sufficient condition, taking into consideration many other 
potential factors. Still, our results suggest that cereal prices play a vital role in conflict 
onset. Moreover, in order to promote peace-building and to mitigate conflict, controlling 
wheat price may have an effect in the Sudanese context.  
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF TERRORISM ON CEREAL DEMAND IN SUDAN 
Introduction 
Basic Introduction about Sudan 
Sudan is the third largest country in Africa. About 80 percent of the population 
are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. Additionally, agriculture makes up 90 
percent of non-oil export earnings (Abdelrahman 1998). Cereal crops serve as a vital 
calorie source in the diet (Abdelrahman 1990). Sudan has been suffering from conflict 
including terrorism for most of its history. The impacts of terrorism are reflected in both 
direct human, commodity and infrastructure damages and in long-term effects on local 
economy. Sudanese face ongoing threats, uncertainty, and fears from terrorism. Such a 
situation can affect food demand and this will be explored herein. 
Cereals as a Food Source in Sudan 
Sorghum, millet, and wheat are the three main cereals in Sudan, providing 
around 60 percent of country level cereal consumption (Hamid 2003). Sorghum is the 
main staple food in the northern part of the country with millet being that in western 
Sudan. Wheat is an important diet component for which demand is growing particularly 
in northern Sudan (FEWS NET 2012). In recent years, Sudan has had a surplus of 
sorghum and has been self-sufficient in millet, but Sudan produced much less wheat than 
was consumed (Osman 1989) with increasing imports over time rising to as much as 75 
percent of the wheat consumed between 2000 to 2010 (Miustafa 2013). Furthermore, 
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growth in domestic wheat production is slower than consumption growth, with 
production technology and environmental conditions the likely causes (Ageeb 1994).   
Donors have been willing to provide food aid in form of wheat or wheat flour, in 
order to reduce the domestic cereal deficit and help rural development. Terrorism 
incidents have also tended to increase donor wheat aid and consumption. The increased 
domestic wheat consumption and dependency on imports forms a “dilemma” for 
domestic policy and foreign aid institutions. Wheat imports have been costly and 
worsened Sudan’s negative trade balance (Hassan and Faki 1993). The country also 
contains a large population component that is food insecure and this is expected to 
continue during the next decade with the wheat deficit contributing (Elmulthum et al. 
2011). 
Policy debates about reducing Sudan’s high dependence on imported wheat have 
lasted for many years, centering on pricing mechanisms and domestic production 
enhancements. Ali (1998) asserts that the domestic resources for wheat production 
should be fully exploited to bridge the gap. Sudan has stated plans to expand the land 
devoted to wheat production by 25 percent each year, targeting wheat self-sufficiency in 
five years’ time (Mazen 2010), but that has not fully happened to date. In addition, some 
scholars recommend the allocation of substantial financial resources to enhance food 
production by investing in agricultural technology, education, agricultural extension, and 
infrastructure (Elmulthum et al. 2012). Additionally, Ibraheim (1996) indicates that food 
aid while stabilizing domestic consumption has a negative effect on the achievement of 
self-sufficiency. 
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Theoretical Motivation 
Nzuma and Saeker (2010) argue that an understanding of food demand 
determinants and associated price elasticities allows policymakers to design effective 
and efficient policies. Sadoulet and de Janvry (1995) claim that elasticity estimates play 
an essential role for future business investment. Moreover, the identification of dynamic 
relationships among the set of variables involved with demand could provide insights for 
policy-making. Previous demand research has concentrated on estimating the 
relationship between prices and quantities sometimes incorporating demographic factors 
(Dudek 2010; Davis et al. 2011). In Sudan, terrorism is an important demographic factor. 
It affects household consumption patterns, income, market function, personal security, 
and costs of living among other factors. Numerous studies have examined the 
macroeconomic effects of terrorism (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003, 2008), but to our 
knowledge none have explored the influence of terrorism on food demand. Therefore, 
this paper will attempt to bridge the gap by incorporating the effects of terrorism into 
demand estimation for three major cereals (sorghum, millet, and wheat) in Sudan. This 
will be examined using both an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model and a 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). Moreover, to better understand the cereal demand 
situation, we utilize both AIDS and DAG models to predict the three cereal consumption 
shares in Sudan, and compare their forecast performance to identify a model with better 
forecast. 
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Estimation Strategy 
To carry out the estimation, a widely used static demand system – the AIDS 
model and a DAG approach are employed. The AIDS model is selected because of its 
common usage in empirical demand analysis (Buse 1994). Nevertheless, there may exist 
the problem of endogeneity that may bias the results. Specifically, the three cereal prices 
are highly likely to be correlated with each other, given that they are primary calories 
sources for the Sudanese population. Consequently, DAGs are utilized to circumvent 
that problem (Akleman et al. 1999). When estimating the DAG, we implement the 
following procedures. The first step is to explore if the levels of each series are 
stationary using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The second step is to 
determine the optimal lag length based on Hannan and Quinn loss metrics using a 
maximum of four lags in levels and three for first differences as recommended by Wang 
and Bessler (2003). The third step is to use the TETRAD V software to get the graphical 
models.  
In what follows, we examine the forecast performance of the AIDS model (with 
and without the theoretical homogeneity or symmetry constraints) and the DAG model 
with several criteria. To achieve this goal, we estimate the three models during the 
period 1970 – 2000. Then rested upon the estimations, we generate one-step-ahead and 
two-step-ahead out of sample forecasts from 2001 to 2012 recursively. Additionally, 
encompassing tests are implemented to determine which model encompasses another 
one. 
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Data 
The dataset that will be used herein consists of yearly observations on Sudanese 
consumption and prices from 1966 to 2012, for wheat, sorghum and millet coupled with 
terrorism data.
26
 These commodities constitute about 70% of the calories gained by 
individuals in Sudan (Elmulthum 2007). 
Data on total domestic consumption were obtained from IndexMundi.
27
 Cereal 
prices were assembled from three databases: Datamarket for 1966-2006, FAO Statistics 
(FAOSTAT) for 2007-2011, and the FAO Global Information and Early Warning 
System (GIEWS) for 2012. The price series are current local currency units (LCU) per 
tonne. In addition, the price in 2012 is formed from a monthly weighting of wholesale 
prices. Annual expenditures are derived by multiplying quantities and prices and then 
adding up all the individual cereal crop expenditures. With respect to expenditure share 
of each cereal, they are obtained by dividing the total expenditure by the individual 
cereal expenditure. 
Data about terrorism come from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) that is 
developed by START (2013). GTD defines a terrorist event as, “the threatened or actual 
use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to obtain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START 2013). For 
                                                 
26
 The data on terrorism events span from 1970 to 2012. All the other series start from 1966 and end in 
2012. 
27
 Here we add up the commodity use for food, seed, and industrial uses (FSI) as the measure of total 
domestic consumption. The unit of measurement is 1000 MT (metric tonnes or tonnes). “IndexMundi is a 
data portal that gathers facts and statistics from multiple sources and turns them into easy to use visuals.” 
Please refer to http://www.indexmundi.com/about.html for more information. 
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each terrorism incident documented, GTD offers details on the exact date, location, 
targets and perpetrators, weapons used, among other items. In this study, we use the 
annual count of such terrorist events to capture the frequency characteristics.  
Model Specification 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
The Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) formulation for an Almost Ideal Demand 
System (AIDS) model is: 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛 (𝑋𝑡 𝑃𝑡)⁄ + 𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.     (4.1) 
where N is the number of commodities in the system; T is the number of time periods; 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 represents the expenditure share of the i-th commodity at time t, that is 𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑞𝑖𝑡/𝑋𝑡 with 𝑝𝑖𝑡 and 𝑞𝑖𝑡 being the price and quantity consumed for the i-th commodity at 
time t, and 𝑋𝑡 being the total consumption expenditure on all of the N commodities at 
time t; 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖𝑗 are the parameters to be estimated. 𝑃𝑡 is the price index at time t, which 
is defined as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.     (4.2) 
The price index above makes the system non-linear, which complicates the 
estimation process. To simplify estimation, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) suggest use 
of a linear, Stone’s price index: 
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1             (4.3) 
The corresponding equation is referred to as the linear approximate/almost ideal 
demand system (LA/AIDS). However, this simplified approximation for 𝑃𝑡 brings about 
another problem – simultaneity, since two variables 𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡 are codetermined. 
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In this context, the coefficients can be easily interpreted: 𝛼𝑖 stands for the 
consumption of the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ commodity; 𝛽𝑖 reflects the change in the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ commodity’s 
expenditure share with respect to the percentage change in real income holding all the 
other variables constant; 𝛾𝑖𝑗 indicates the change in the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ commodity’s expenditure 
share stimulated by a one percent change in the 𝑗 − 𝑡ℎ commodity’s price holding all the 
other variables constant.  
To estimate the effects of terrorism on demand, we add a variable identifying 
extent of terrorism into the basic AIDS model (i.e., equation (4.1)) as follows: 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛 𝑝𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛 (𝑋𝑡 𝑃𝑡)⁄ + 𝜃𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑍𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.
              (4.4) 
where 𝑍𝑡 is the number of terrorism incidents in time t; 𝜃𝑖 are the parameters to be 
estimated, representing the change in the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ commodity’s expenditure share with 
respect to the percentage change in number of terrorism events. 
The theoretical restrictions on the parameters of equation (4.1) are:  
Adding-up: ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 1,   ∑ 𝛽𝑖 = 0
𝑁
𝑖=1 ,   ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 0      𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑛
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
𝑖=1 .      (4.5) 
Homogeneity: ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 0       𝑖 = 1,2, … . , 𝑛.
𝑁
𝑗=1          (4.6) 
Symmetry: 𝛾𝑖𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗𝑖           𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.           (4.7) 
It is well acknowledged that the restrictions (4.5) (i.e., the adding up constraint) 
are part of a maintained hypothesis of any demand system (Deaton and Muellbauer 
1980) and can be imposed by not estimating one of the equations. Thus, one only needs 
to test the restrictions implied by homogeneity (4.5) and symmetry (4.6).  
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The Marshallian (uncompensated) demand elasticities from the linearized model 
are expressed as follows (Green and Alston 1990): 
Income elasticity: 𝜂𝑖 = 1 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑤𝑖  ⁄           (4.8) 
Price elasticity: 𝜀𝑖𝑗 = −𝛿𝑖𝑗 + (𝛾𝑖𝑗 − 𝛽𝑖𝑤𝑗) 𝑤𝑖⁄ , where 𝛿𝑖𝑗 = 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗; 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
              (4.9) 
Since the AIDS model originates from a coherent analytical framework, it’s 
relatively easy to estimate and interpret. However, the underlying assumption of the 
AIDS model is that consumption is always in equilibrium, which does not usually hold 
in most empirical cases. For instance, changing preferences or habits, incomplete 
information, and adjustment to the exogenous shocks to prices and income can lead to 
short term disequilibrium in consumption. It is probably one of the reasons why most 
static LAIDS models do not satisfy the theoretical restrictions (Duffy 2003). 
Furthermore, AIDS models assume that prices of the three major cereals are independent 
of each other, which is in conflict with our knowledge in Sudan. We will also use a DAG 
approach to overcome these limitations of the AIDS model. 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) 
Following Bessler and Loper (2001), a directed graph represents the causal 
relationship among a set of variables. More rigorously, it consists of an ordered triple 
< 𝑽, 𝑴, 𝑬 >. Therein, 𝑽 stands for a nonempty set of vertices (variables); 𝑴 is a 
nonempty set of marks (i.e., symbols attached to the end of undirected edges); 𝑬 
represents a set of ordered pairs. Every element in the set 𝑬 is termed as an edge. If 
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vertices (variables) are connected by an edge, then we say they are adjacent. A directed 
acyclic graph is a directed graph without directed cyclic paths.   
In recent years, based on different assumptions of data series, multiple search 
algorithms have been proposed to build directed acyclic graphs that reveal causal 
structures based on how certain data change over time, including Gaussian-innovation 
based algorithms, non-Gaussian-innovation based algorithms, and the like. That is, the 
fundamental assumptions of innovations distributions differentiate those methods. To do 
this, the commonly used methods are the PC algorithm (Spirtes et al. 2000) and Greedy 
Equivalence Search (GES) algorithm (Chickering 2003), which are Gaussian-innovation 
based methods. Additionally, the linear Non-Gaussian Acyclic Model (LiNGAM) 
algorithm (Shimizu et al. 2006) is usually utilized to manipulate non-Gaussian 
innovations. As will be displayed in the later session, a majority of our data series follow 
Gaussian distributions. Thus the PC and GES algorithms therefore will be employed to 
discover the DAG and embodied causal structure. 
The PC algorithm starts from unrestricted relationships among variables of 
interest (i.e., any two variables are connected with undirected edges). Then edges 
between variables are removed stepwise to remove cases where there are not “causal 
flows” where the items exhibit zero correlation or partial correlation (conditional 
correlation) (Akleman et al. 1999). Note that the conditioning variable(s) on the deleted 
edges between two variables is termed as the sepset of those variables (the sepset is 
empty for vanishing zero-order conditioning information) (Bessler and Loper 2001). For 
more detailed description of PC algorithms, please refer to Spirtes et al. (2000). A caveat 
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has to be made before proceeding. The significance level plays a critical role in 
implementing PC algorithms to obtain graphically causal structure. Spirtes et al. (2000) 
explain the setting of the significance levels plainly, “…the significance level used in 
making decisions should decrease as the sample sizes increase, and the use of higher 
significance levels (e.g., 0.2 at the sample sizes less than 100, and 0.1 at sample sizes 
between 100 and 300) may improve performance at small sizes.” As a result, we set the 
significance level to 0.2, taking into account that our sample size is less than 100. 
The GES algorithm is a two-stage search algorithm that uses scoring criteria to 
build the DAG. In contrast to the PC algorithm, GES begins with an utterly independent 
(disconnected) graph and then proceeds to add edges (or reverses edge direction) for 
which the Bayesian posterior score is improved the most. This process is repeated until 
no additional edges or reverse directions can be added which improve the score. On the 
basis of the result of the first stage, the second stage is to implement the algorithm 
backwards. That is, edges are removed or directions are reversed if such changes raise 
the Bayesian posterior score. Similarly, this stage continues until no higher score 
emerges. Chickering (2003) provides a thorough and clear description of GES algorithm 
and its implementation. 
Edges or directions that remain robust in both algorithms may be considered to 
be in a higher level of confidence, compared with cases that edges or directions change 
across the two algorithms (Zhang et al. 2006). 
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Estimation Results and Discussion 
Estimation of the AIDS Model 
Two AIDS demand models (i.e., with and without the “terrorist attack” variable), 
will be formed following the steps:  
 estimate the parameters of demand system for wheat, sorghum, and millet in 
Sudan; 
 test the restrictions of homogeneity and symmetry; 
 calculate the elasticities based on the parameters estimated and constraints 
tested. 
A caveat has to be made here. One underlying assumption is weak separability 
from other commodities, including food and non-food. Therefore, the choices and 
preferences within the three cereals are assumed to be independent of price changes of 
other goods. 
To avoid singularity in the covariance matrix, the millet equation is dropped 
during estimation. The whole system is unchanged, regardless of which equation is 
ignored. In addition, the parameters in the dropped equation (i.e., millet equation) can be 
derived from the adding-up constraint. 
We present the consequent empirical estimates for AIDS models with/without 
the “terrorist attack” variable in Table 11 including the associated standard errors. 
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Table 11. Regression Results of AIDS 
Independent Variable 
Wheat Sorghum Millet 
Status of the "terrorist attack" variable inclusion 
Excluded Included Excluded Included Excluded Included 
log_expenditure 0.080*** 0.042 -0.027 -0.047 -0.053 0.005 
 
(0.029) (0.040) (0.027) (0.042) ---- ---- 
logp_wheat 0.133*** 0.132*** -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.002 0.006 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) ---- ---- 
logp_sorghum -0.086*** -0.075*** 0.252*** 0.256*** -0.166 -0.180 
 
(0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027) ---- ---- 
logp_millet -0.041* -0.051** -0.117*** -0.115*** 0.158 0.166 
 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) ---- ---- 
log_incidents ---- 0.022*** ---- -0.004 ---- -0.019 
 
---- (0.009) ---- (0.01) ---- ---- 
Constant -0.443** -0.143 0.875*** 1.022** ---- ---- 
 
(0.216) (0.308) (0.206) (0.319) ---- ---- 
R-squared 0.550 0.712 0.644 0.723 ---- ---- 
Note: 1)* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
          2) Values in the parentheses are the standard errors. 
 
 
Expenditure coefficients (log_expenditure) measure the response of the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ 
commodity budget share to a 1% increase in real expenditures. Negative numbers imply 
necessary goods while positive ones indicate luxury goods. Thus, results in Table 11 
suggest that wheat is a luxury without the “terrorist attack” variable. After we 
incorporate the terrorism variable, the wheat expenditure coefficient becomes 
insignificant and positive. The other expenditure coefficients are also statistically 
insignificant. 
In general, the parameters relating to price effects are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. These parameters reflect the impacts of price on budget shares. Notice 
that we cannot conclude if two goods are complements or substitutes merely based on 
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the sign of 𝛾𝑖𝑗, because of the mixed income and substitute effects. Thus, we need to 
employ the cross-price elasticity of demand instead. In other words, the inductive 
meaning of the price coefficients (𝛾𝑖𝑖) is limited.  
As expected, inclusion of the “terrorist attack” variable improves the goodness-
of-fit as shown by the R-squared values. In addition, the coefficient of “terrorist attack” 
in the wheat equation is significantly positive, indicating that terror attacks do exert a 
positive effect on the budget share of wheat in Sudan. Intuitively, Sudanese probably 
tend to spend relatively more money on wheat once terrorist attacks break out, largely 
due to the increasing foreign aid of wheat. In contrast, terrorist attacks have negative but 
insignificant effects on the budget shares of sorghum or millet, which means it is 
possible that the outbreak of terrorist attacks reduces spending on sorghum and millet. 
However, this is not conclusive as such negative influences are not statistically 
significant. 
The restrictions of economic theory are tested by standard asymptotic tests – 
likelihood ratio (LR) statistics derived from the estimates. The corresponding test 
statistics are reported in Table 12. As shown as follows, homogeneity (Equation (4.6)) 
alone, symmetry (Equation (4.7)) alone, and homogeneity & symmetry (Equation (4.6) 
& (4.7)) are not rejected for both AIDS models. 
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Table 12. Tests of Restrictions 
 
"terrorist attack" excluded 
"terrorist attack" 
included 
Null Hypothesis LR χ2 df. P-value 
LR 
χ2 
df. P-value 
Homogeneity 2.36 2 0.3079 2.88 2 0.237 
Symmetry 3.76 3 0.2884 5.71 3 0.1266 
Homogeneity & 
Symmetry 
3.76 3 0.2884 5.71 3 0.1266 
 
 
Elasticities of demand derived from the AIDS models with and without terrorism 
included, with the restrictions imposed are presented in Table 13. Almost all the 
elasticities of demand are positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 significance 
level, implying that the expenditure shares for these cereal crops are sensitive to changes 
in total expenditure and the prices of three commodities. 
 
Table 13. Elasticities Estimations 
 Expenditure 
Price 
 
Wheat Sorghum Millet 
 
Status of the "terrorist attack" Variable Inclusion 
 
Exclude Include Exclude Include Exclude Include Exclude Include 
Wheat 1.378*** 1.304*** -0.623*** -0.592*** -0.643*** -0.585*** -0.111* -0.129** 
 
(0.068) (0.101) (0.069) (0.063) (0.081) (0.084) (0.058) (0.056) 
Sorghum 0.951*** 0.953*** -0.214*** -0.205*** -0.513*** -0.540*** -0.224*** -0.209*** 
 
(0.033) (0.054) (0.034) (0.031) (0.055) (0.058) (0.035) (0.035) 
Millet 0.471 0.597 0.056 -0.033 -0.527 -0.541 -0.001 -0.022 
 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The expenditure elasticities are expected to be positive. Expenditure elasticities 
for wheat in both models are greater than one (1.378 and 1.304), and are less than one 
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for sorghum and millet. These magnitudes indicate that wheat is a luxury good in Sudan 
compared with sorghum and millet, regardless of the “terrorist attack” variable. The 
finding that the wheat expenditure elasticity exceeds one is consistent with our 
expectation since wheat is mainly perceived as the cereal for the generally wealthier 
people in the urban areas. In terms of terrorism we find a decline in expenditure 
elasticities particularly for wheat. Intuitively, when terror attacks occur, foreign 
organizations usually offer additional aid in the form of wheat or wheat flour, which 
explains a consumption increase but price decrease which likely explains the slight 
decline in the wheat expenditure elasticity in the model including terrorism. In terms of 
sorghum and millet, they are traditional staple commodities in Sudan. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that expenditure elasticities for them are less than one. Inclusion of the 
“terrorist attack” variable raises their expenditure elasticities. One possible explanation 
is that terrorist incidences lead to the shortage of sorghum or millet, and this further lifts 
the price of millet. 
Own-price elasticities of demand for each cereal have the expected negative sign 
and are statistically significant at 0.01 levels, satisfying the well-acknowledged inverse 
relationship between price and quantity demanded. The signs of the cross-price 
elasticities for the three commodities are nearly all negative and statistically significant 
at the 0.01 levels. That is to say, they are complements, although they are believed to be 
substitutes with each other based on our knowledge of Sudan. 
With regard to the effects of including terrorism, one other result is that we see 
the cross-price elasticity for millet and wheat changing sign with it moving from positive 
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(substitute) to negative (complements). More generally, the estimated elasticities in 
Table 13 show slight differences in magnitude. For instance, the expenditure elasticity of 
wheat decreases while those for sorghum and millet increase. It is likely due to the 
increased wheat food aid and price changes stimulated by terrorist attacks. 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) 
DAGs will avoid problems of potential endogenity and allow us to examine their 
dynamic interrelationship. We explore the relationships inherent in the time series data 
for the three major cereals and terrorism from 1967 to 2012. In the model, we consider 
relationships between seven variables: the prices for the three cereals and their 
corresponding consumption quantities, and the number of terrorism incidents. All 
estimations are conducted over the natural logarithms of the series.
28
 Before 
implementing the DAGs, several tests are performed. 
First of all, we examined stationarity of each time series (variable) as 
nonstationary items may compromise the statistical tests and can yield “spurious” 
regressions (Bessler and Kling 1984). To do this, we apply the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test as explained in Harris (1995). We find we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that all variables are nonstationary (I (1)) at the 0.001 significance level. 
The second step is to determine the optimal overall lag length (i.e., the same 
number of lags on each variable in the model building). This is determined using a 
likelihood ratio test (Hamilton, 1994): 
                                                 
28
 We obtain similar results if original format of data series are employed. 
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𝐿𝑅(𝑗) = 2{𝐿𝐿(𝑗) − 𝐿𝐿(𝑗 − 1)}; 𝑗 = 0,1, … , 𝐽      (4.10) 
𝐿𝐿(𝑗) = −
𝑇
2
{𝑙𝑛|𝛴𝑗| + 𝐾𝑙𝑛(2𝜋) + 𝐾}       (4.11) 
where T is the number of observations; 𝐾 is the number of equations; 𝐽 is the maximum 
lags used in the system; 𝛴𝑗 is the variance-covariance matrix of the innovations from 
vector autoregression (VAR) with j lags (VAR(j)); 𝐿𝐿(𝑗) stands for the log likelihood 
for a VAR(j). The null hypothesis states that the parameter at lag j should be zero. 
In this study, we will apply Hannan and Quinn loss function approach to specify 
the optimal lag length. 
 𝐻𝑄 = −2(𝐿𝐿(𝑗) 𝑇⁄ ) + 2𝑡𝑝ln {ln(𝑇)}/𝑇        (4.12) 
where the notation has the same meaning with equation (4.11). Additionally, 𝑝∗ is the 
total number of parameters in each equation. 
As explained before, the maximum of lags in levels is set at four, and three for 
the first difference level, respectively (Wang and Bessler 2003). We find the fit criteria 
obtain their minimum when three lags are used. Nonetheless, due to the small size of our 
dataset (i.e., there are only 42 observations in total), a one period lag is imposed on the 
graphical models. Therefore, we consider the seven variables’ current values and their 
corresponding one period lagged values for TETRAD search. 
Then we import the whole dataset consisting of fourteen variables (i.e., seven 
current values and their one time period lagged values) into TETRAD V, only with time 
ordering constraints (i.e., the past may affect the future, but not vice versa). To 
determine the algorithm we use, Jarque-Bera normality tests are performed for each 
series. If the data follows a normal distribution, then the Jarque-Bera statistic satisfies a 
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chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom. In addition, the Jarque-Bera test 
takes into account both the skewness and kurtosis.  
Results indicate that sorghum price, millet price, the number of terrorist attacks, 
and their lagged values reject the null hypothesis of normality at a 0.000 significance 
level. Other series pass the normality test at the same significance level. Consequently, 
PC and GES algorithms are employed, albeit that the series aforementioned violate the 
normality assumption. Admittedly, the violation may make models approximate but still 
probably helpful (Akleman et al. 1999). 
As suggested by Spirtes et al. (2000), we choose 0.2 as the alpha value for PC 
algorithm and the result is presented in Figure 6. To some extent, the graph is 
complicated with undirected, directed, and bi-directed edges. Still it indicates that the 
wheat consumption is connected with the terrorist attacks. Prices of the three 
commodities are interrelated with each other, while they are not that directly linked with 
their own consumption quantities. The only exception is the relationship between 
sorghum quantity and lagged sorghum price. 
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Figure 6. Pattern of Causal Flow among Wheat, Sorghum, Millet Price and 
Quantity, Terrorist Incidents, and Accordingly Lagged Ones Based on PC 
Algorithm 
 
 
With respect to the GES result (Figure 7), the graph becomes simpler compared 
with the PC result in Figure 6. Two main conclusions remain: one is that wheat 
consumption is affected by terrorist attacks; another one is that three commodities’ 
prices and consumption quantities are not directly linked. 
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Figure 7. Pattern of Causal Flow among Wheat, Sorghum, Millet Price and 
Quantity, Terrorist Incidents, and Accordingly Lagged Ones Based on GES 
Algorithm 
 
 
Several different specifications of variables were also analyzed with PC and GES 
algorithms, including the original and first differenced variables. In addition, we 
considered first differenced variables, lagged first differenced variables (with one time 
period), and lagged original variables.  Under these alternatives, the graphs generated 
varied substantially, indicating that the conclusions derived from the graphs in Figure 6 
and Figure 7 are not robust. Still, across all of these graphs we found some common 
characteristics. One is that the correlation between wheat consumption and terrorism 
remains regardless of the particular variable specification. The second one is that we find 
a weak linkage between own prices and consumption quantities. The third one is that 
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three commodity prices are closely connected despite of disparate pathways, indicating 
that an endogeneity problem does exist in the traditional AIDS models. 
Forecast Evaluation 
Following the same estimation procedures described above, we analyze two 
AIDS models (i.e., AIDS model without any constraints, AIDS model with homogeneity 
and symmetry constraints) with seemingly unrelated regression model recursively 
covering from 1970 to 2000. Taking into account that to some extent terrorism could 
affect the cereal consumption in Sudan, we therefore incorporate the variable of 
terrorism into the AIDS models. To be consistent or to make sure the forecasts from 
different models are comparable, variables included in the DAG model are also 
commodity prices, expenditure, share, and terrorism, which are a little different from 
those investigated above. Specifically, take the model with wheat share for example. We 
start from the completely undirected graph consisting of wheat share, the total 
expenditure, the prices of wheat, sorghum, millet, and the number of terrorist attacks. 
Likewise, considering the sample size that is less than 100, we choose the 0.2 
significance level to remove the edges and obtain the final DAG model – Figure 8. Only 
one undirected edges that were connected to the wheat share: wheat price (log formed). 
Nevertheless, we cannot identify the cause and effect. Therefore, we assume wheat share 
follows a random walk. 
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Figure 8. DAG for Wheat Share Equation: 1970 – 2000 
 
 
Similarly, we implement the above procedures to other two equations (i.e., 
sorghum and millet) of the AIDS model iteratively. As a result, the final DAG models 
for forecasting are as follows. Wheat share series follows a random walk till 2007 while 
it is a function of terrorist attacks and wheat price since 2008. Both sorghum and millet 
share series are random walks from 2001 to 2012.
29
 
Before generating forecasts of the three commodities’ share based on the models 
estimated above, we need to obtain the forecasts of the contemporaneous variables on 
the right hand side of AIDS and DAG models (i.e., three commodities prices, total 
expenditure, and the number of terrorist attacks). Since all the series included here are 
                                                 
29
 Estimation results from AIDS and DAG are not presented here due to the space limitation, but they are 
available upon request. 
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I(1), thus we utilize a random walk model with drift to fit the data.
30
 Then rested upon 
these forecasts and parameters estimated, we generate one-step-ahead and two-step-
ahead forecasts for both AIDS and DAG models from 2001 to 2012 recursively. 
Following Wang and Bessler (2003), we evaluate the forecasted values for wheat, 
sorghum, and millet share on the basis of four criteria, involving equation-by-equation 
(i.e., mean square forecast error (MSFE) and mean absolute percentage error (MAPE)) 
and system standards (i.e., the log determinant and trace of forecast error matrix). Table 
14 summarizes the results of the four criteria for three models’ forecast performance. 
 
Table 14. Forecast Performance on the Three Commodities Consumption Share 
    One - Step  Two - Step 
Model Commodity MSFE MAPE Log(det) Log(trace) MSFE MAPE Log(det) Log(trace) 
AIDS 
Wheat  0.049 2.085 
-16.911 -4.111 
0.050 2.134 
-17.147 -4.227 Sorghum  0.010 0.174 0.010 0.167 
Millet 0.004 0.420 0.004 0.408 
AIDS with 
Constraints 
Wheat  0.051 2.114 
-16.755 -4.171 
0.049 2.086 
-16.988 -4.264 Sorghum  0.009 0.165 0.009 0.164 
Millet 0.003 0.361 0.004 0.381 
DAG 
Wheat  0.037 1.789 
-18.319 -4.873 
0.032 1.699 
-19.950 -5.346 Sorghum  0.004 0.108 0.003 0.100 
Millet 0.003 0.436 0.003 0.512 
 
 
Let’s check the one-step-ahead forecasts first. With respect to MSFE, the DAG 
performs best for the three commodities’ share forecast (i.e., it has the lowest MSFE 
value), followed by AIDS models. The two AIDS models’ MSFE are quite close. We 
                                                 
30
 Here all the data series are logged transformed. 
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can derive similar conclusions under the MAPE standard, except for the millet share 
forecast where the AIDS with constraints produces the lowest MAPE (0.361). Apart 
from these equation-by-equation measurements, we also adopt two system-wide gauges. 
According to the log determinant of forecast error matrix, the DAG model (-18.319) 
appears to have better forecast accuracy compared with AIDS (-16.911) and AIDS with 
constraints (-16.755). However, the log trace of forecast error matrix does not account 
for the effects of covariance among the three commodities series (Wang and Bessler 
2003). Therefore, the log trace suggests a slightly different ordering of models, whereas 
the DAG model still has the lowest log trace score (-4.873). 
Given our small data size of forecast (i.e., 12 observations), we focus on one-
step-ahead forecasts. Still, we present the two-step-ahead forecast results for comparison 
in Table 14. Likewise, most criteria suggest the superiority of the DAG model over the 
others. The only exception is the millet share forecast measured by MAPE. In addition, 
the rank of AIDS and AIDS with constraints models varies slightly with different 
standards. Thus, imposing theoretical constraints on models does not necessarily 
improve their forecast abilities. 
Stepping forward to further access the forecast performance, Table 15 displays 
the encompassing regression results of the hypothesis that forecasts from one model 
encompasses forecasts from another model and vice versa. All the estimations were 
carried out in R with robust errors imposed to account for potential heteroscedasticity. 
Each row in Table 15 provides a test of the encompassing hypothesis.  
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Table 15. Encompassing Tests on One- and Two-Step-Ahead Forecasts of the Three 
Commodities Consumption Share 
Step Ahead Null Hypothesis   λ p Decision 
1 AIDS encompasses AIDS_w Wheat  -0.109 0.794 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  5.144 0.046 Reject 
  
Millet -0.109 0.794 Fail to Reject 
1 AIDS_w encompasses AIDS Wheat  1.109 0.021 Reject 
  
Sorghum  -4.144 0.097 Fail to Reject 
  
Millet 0.148 0.878 Fail to Reject 
1 AIDS encompasses DAG Wheat  0.771 0.118 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  2.168 0.000 Reject 
  
Millet 1.284 0.013 Reject 
1 DAG encompasses AIDS Wheat  0.229 0.622 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  -1.168 0.010 Reject 
  
Millet -0.284 0.518 Fail to Reject 
1 AIDS_W encompasses DAG Wheat  1.217 0.016 Reject 
  
Sorghum  2.228 0.003 Reject 
  
Millet 1.323 0.179 Fail to Reject 
1 DAG encompasses AIDS_w Wheat  -0.217 0.617 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  -1.228 0.057 Fail to Reject 
    Millet -0.323 0.731 Fail to Reject 
Step Ahead Null Hypothesis 
 
λ p Decision 
2 AIDS encompasses AIDS_w Wheat  0.264 0.646 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  2.929 0.321 Fail to Reject 
  
Millet 0.387 0.718 Fail to Reject 
2 AIDS_w encompasses AIDS Wheat  0.736 0.217 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  -1.929 0.506 Fail to Reject 
  
Millet 0.613 0.570 Fail to Reject 
2 AIDS encompasses DAG Wheat  1.453 0.000 Reject 
  
Sorghum  1.453 0.000 Reject 
  
Millet 0.925 0.023 Reject 
2 DAG encompasses AIDS Wheat  0.161 0.755 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  -0.453 0.061 Fail to Reject 
  
Millet 0.075 0.829 Fail to Reject 
2 AIDS_W encompasses DAG Wheat  1.052 0.048 Reject 
  
Sorghum  1.496 0.000 Reject 
  
Millet 0.979 0.079 Fail to Reject 
2 DAG encompasses AIDS_w Wheat  -0.052 0.912 Fail to Reject 
  
Sorghum  -0.496 0.080 Fail to Reject 
    Millet 0.021 0.966 Fail to Reject 
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According to Table 15, we cannot draw a robust conclusion about which one is 
the encompassing or encompassed model at the 0.05 significance level, no matter for 
one- or two-step-ahead forecasts. In other words, the encompassing tests results indicate 
that a combination of the three models probably generate the most accurate forecasts. As 
a matter of fact, one significant advantage of combining forecasts is to learn the data 
generating process better and to achieve better forecasts (Granger and Ramanathan 
1984). 
In what follows, we proceed to estimate the optimal composite weights based on 
the forecasts from 2001 to 2012 with two methods herein. One way is to minimize the 
composite forecast variance subjected to the constraint that the sum of weights is equal 
to unity. Another approach is unrestricted ordinary least squares regression (Granger and 
Ramanathan 1984). That is, there are no restrictions on the weights while a constant item 
should be incorporated instead. The results of optimal weights estimated are summarized 
in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Optimal Weights of Forecasts 
      Optimal Weight 
Method Step Commodity AIDS AIDS with Constraints DAG 
Traditional Method 1 wheat 0.471 -0.085 0.614 
  
sorghum -0.665 0.197 1.468 
 
  millet 0.396 -0.839 1.443 
 
2 wheat 0.282 -0.173 0.891 
  
sorghum -0.205 -0.028 1.232 
  
millet 0.217 -0.423 1.206 
Granger and Ramanathan 1 wheat -0.064 -0.350 0.208 
  
sorghum -1.590 1.164 0.449 
 
  millet -0.536 0.674 -0.197 
 
2 wheat 0.013 -0.057 0.047 
  
sorghum -0.049 0.049 -0.948 
    millet 0.103 0.196 -0.573 
 
 
Apparently, different methods offer different combination strategies. For 
example, the traditional method always assigns a positive weight on the DAG model 
whereas it is not the case with the second method. Consequently, an out-of-sample 
evaluation of those composite forecasts is needed to access their forecast effectiveness. 
Nonetheless, data beyond the dataset in this paper are lacking. Hopefully, we may 
implement the evaluation process in the near future.
31
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Additionally, an equal-weighted rule is another popular method for combined forecasts. Therefore, we 
also calculated the equal weights for the three models with OLS and then compare the results with the 
weights suggested by Granger and Ramanathan’s (GR) method (Error! Reference source not found.). 
According to F test (or Wald test), we fail to reject the hypothesis that weights indicated by the two 
methods are statistically equal. In other words, equal-weighted and GR methods are statistically equivalent 
for composited forecast in our case. Therefore, we may choose equal weights unless we have robust 
evidence to hold other unequal weights (Armstrong 2001). Nevertheless, due to our modest sample size, 
we may still recommend the evaluation process. 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper explores the way terrorism affects cereal demand in Sudan applying 
classic AIDS models and an alternative way for modeling – DAGs. Additionally, the 
forecasts of the three cereal consumption shares by AIDS and DAG models are 
implemented. Several findings emerge. 
First, we find an increase in terror attacks does not greatly affect consumers’ 
behavior although we do see some changes in expenditure and price elasticities 
particularly for wheat. That elasticity increases, which is likely due to an increase in 
foreign aid providing low cost wheat after attacks which in turn increases consumption 
causing an increase in the budget share of wheat positively. Simultaneous sorghum and 
millet elasticities decrease reflecting a substitution of what for those commodities. Also 
the graphic models tentatively suggest that wheat consumption is related to the terrorist 
attacks and that wheat price is indirectly linked to terrorism in most graphs. Second we 
find wheat is a relatively luxury good while sorghum and millet are found to be 
necessities. This is consistent with the current situation of cereal market in Sudan. Third, 
all own-price elasticities have the expected negative signs showing downward sloping 
demand. Fourth, the cross-price elasticities are inconsistent with expectations: the results 
of both AIDS models indicate that the commodities are complements. Theoretically, the 
commodities should act as substitutes with each other. We feel the unexpected results 
probably originate from the validity of dataset as will be discussed later. Fourthly, we 
find that prices and consumption of the three cereals are not closely related to each other. 
Finally, the DAG model outperforms the AIDS models in forecasting the commodity 
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consumption shares in most cases, while we cannot conclude that it is the encompassing 
model. We therefore suggest the combined forecasts from different models should be 
employed to achieve better forecasts. 
Considering the conclusion of Chapter III, Chapter IV, and the current situation 
in Sudan, we propose that wheat is marginally affected by or affecting the terrorism 
(conflict) situation in Sudan. Chapter III suggests higher wheat prices cause more 
conflict events. However, Chapter III does not incorporate wheat consumption due to the 
unavailability of quantity data. In recent years, Sudan has been experiencing increasing 
wheat consumption and wheat food aid, with low levels of domestic wheat production. 
As a result, we propose that higher wheat price can affect wheat consumption and further 
induce terrorist attacks (conflicts).  
On the basis of these wheat findings, we tentatively suggest that policy 
interventions mentioned in Chapter III, like introducing advanced and appropriate wheat 
production technology, could be implemented to improve Sudanese wheat production 
and this in turn may well help control wheat price and consumption, and further mitigate 
terrorist attacks. Likewise, other possible policy initiatives could involve lowering the 
imported wheat tariff or imposing subsidy. 
There are many limitations that characterize this study, which could be improved 
in future research. First, the prices used in this paper are wholesale prices instead of 
retail prices, due to the huge difficulty of obtaining micro data in Sudan. Second, the 
time range of our yearly dataset is short compared with many other empirical studies. It 
is highly likely that these are the reasons why the three commodities indicate a 
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complementary relationship in this study. Furthermore, we need to examine the accuracy 
of the combined forecasts beyond the range of the dataset we used. Therefore, there is a 
need for more valid and comprehensive datasets. Also, we may introduce subjective 
probability into the modeling with Bayesian techniques in the future studies. 
Additionally our terror attack variable is limited and a richer specification might 
be introduced that considers, not only frequency, but also severity incorporating the 
number of dead or wounded in the attacks providing that data could be found.   
Finally, alternative demand approaches could be used, such as the Inverse 
Almost Ideal Demand System (IAIDS) and Error Correction Model-Almost Ideal 
Demand System (ECM-AIDS), to further explore the cereal demand structure in Sudan. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation conducts analysis pertaining to causal factors and effects of 
conflict considering three main facets of the issue: 
The effects of climate on conflict; 
The causality between commodity prices and conflict; 
The relationship among food prices, consumption, and terrorist attacks (one form 
of conflict). 
In Chapter II (the first essay), I quantitatively explore the linkage between 
climate and conflict. In this effort I extend the current literature by carrying out a broad 
global and multi-year study considering both climate and other country-related 
characteristics. To achieve these objectives, I separated the dataset into two partitions for 
model estimation and validation, respectively. I then carried out estimation with both 
parametric and semiparametric techniques to unravel the link between climate and 
conflict. Subsequently I made predictions of conflict incidence. The results render robust 
evidence that a lower level of precipitation this year relative to last increases the 
probability of civil conflict. Additionally, I found that semiparametric models are 
superior out of sample predictors compared with parametric models. 
Beyond the general cross-country research, it is indispensable and critical to 
perform case studies on conflict to understand causal factors and effects. Consequently, 
in Chapter III and Chapter IV, research is conducted on conditions in Sudan, an African 
country that has been beset by violent conflict for many decades. 
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Chapter III (the second essay) investigates the relationship between staple food 
prices (sorghum, millet, and wheat) and conflict events in Sudan. To do this, I utilized a 
time series SVAR model, allowing for asymmetric lag length structures plus innovation 
accounting techniques to depict the dynamic interaction among the variables of interest. 
The results indicate that the only significant linkage between food prices and conflict 
events in Sudan originates from the wheat market. Specifically, I find that, higher wheat 
prices lead to more conflict events, not vice versa. Moreover, this impact persists for 
almost two years after prices rise, even though it decreases over time. 
Chapter IV (the third essay) examines the impacts of terrorism on demand for the 
three main cereals in Sudan. Both traditional AIDS models and a DAG are employed. In 
turn, I find terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on consumers’ behavior 
whereas they do impose some impacts on expenditure and price elasticities particularly 
for wheat. Analysis over the graphic models tentatively indicates that there exists a 
direct relationship between wheat consumption and terrorist attacks, and an indirect 
linkage between wheat price and terrorist attacks as well. In addition, I generate 
forecasts of the three commodities consumption shares using the AIDS and DAG models 
plus a composite of them, taking into account the effect of terrorist attacks. As a result, I 
find that combined combinations of the forecasts from those models could obtain better 
forecasts. 
Now I discuss some limitations of this work which may be overcome in future 
studies. 
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The Chapter II analysis only identified a link between climate and conflict but 
not a specific mechanism, since I employed reduced-form methods. Considering the 
importance of understanding the climate-conflict pathway in policy design, it would be 
of interest for future research to address linkages more explicitly perhaps following 
suggestions in Burke et al. (2014). 
In Chapter III, I had a limited data set and only included commodity prices and 
indicators on conflict events. Nevertheless, there are likely other determinants that may 
interact with those variables considered. For instance, South Sudan seceded from Sudan 
in July 2011. Thus it is entirely possible that food prices in Sudan could affect or be 
affected by those in South Sudan. Consequently, future work could extend the current 
work by enlarging the variety of causal factors in the dataset. 
For Chapter IV, the analysis was limited by the short time period for which data 
were available, which in turn limits the robustness and validity of the results. Hence, 
datasets covering more time would be a useful extension in future studies. Moreover, 
subjective probability could also be taken into the account with Bayesian techniques. 
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APPENDIX 
Suppose precipitation 𝑅 follows a normal distribution, with mean 𝜇 and standard 
deviation 𝜎. Extreme events are defined as those values higher than 𝑏 or lower than 𝑎, 
where 𝑎 < 𝜇 < 𝑏. Therefore, the probability of extreme events incident is: 
𝑃 = 1 −  𝑃(𝑎 < 𝑅 < 𝑏) 
where 
𝑃(𝑎 < 𝑅 < 𝑏) = 𝑃(
𝑎 − 𝜇
𝜎
<
𝑅 − 𝜇
𝜎
<
𝑏 − 𝜇
𝜎
) 
 
Denote 
𝑌 =
𝑅 − 𝜇
𝜎
 
then 𝑌 follows a normal distribution, with mean 0 and standard distribution 1. 
Thus, 
𝑃(𝑎 < 𝑅 < 𝑏) = 𝑃 (
𝑎 − 𝜇
𝜎
< 𝑌 <
𝑏 − 𝜇
𝜎
) = ∫
1
√2𝜋
𝑒−
𝑦2
2
𝑏−𝜇
𝜎
𝑎−𝜇
𝜎
𝑑𝑦 
=
1
2
[𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑏 − 𝜇
√2𝜎
) − 𝑒𝑟 𝑓 (
𝑎 − 𝜇
√2𝜎
)] 
where 𝑒𝑟𝑓 (∙) is usually called error function and defined as  
𝑒𝑟 𝑓(𝑥) =
2
√𝜋
∫ 𝑒−𝑡
2
𝑥
0
𝑑𝑡 
Thus, 𝑒𝑟𝑓 (∙) is an increasing function. 
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When the standard deviation increases from 𝜎 to 𝜎′ (i.e., 𝜎 < 𝜎′), the likelihood 
of extreme events incidents is 
 𝑃′ = 1 −  𝑃′(𝑎 < 𝑅 < 𝑏) 
where 
𝑃′(𝑎 < 𝑅 < 𝑏) = 𝑃′(
𝑎 − 𝜇
𝜎′
<
𝑅 − 𝜇
𝜎′
<
𝑏 − 𝜇
𝜎′
) 
=
1
2
[𝑒𝑟𝑓 (
𝑏 − 𝜇
√2𝜎′
) − 𝑒𝑟 𝑓 (
𝑎 − 𝜇
√2𝜎′
)] 
 
Thus, we have 
𝑃(𝑎 < 𝑅 < 𝑏) > 𝑃′(𝑎 < 𝑅 < 𝑏), 
followed by 
𝑃 < 𝑃′ 
That is, as the variability of precipitation increases, the probability of extreme 
events rises as well. 
 
 
 
  
